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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Statement of Issue. Whether a valid contract for the sale of real estate exists when

the contract has not been signed and accepted by the seller even though the contract specifically
requires such acceptance.
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
2.

Statement of Issue. Whether an individual may tortiously interfere with a contract

that does not exist as a matter of law.
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
3.

Statement of Issue. Whether acts by an individual, which allegedly took place

after an offer to contract expired without being accepted, can be construed as having interfered
with the contract.
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985).
4.

Statement of Issue. Whether a mechanic's lien may be classified as wrongful

because it was filed without making a demand for payment.

-I-

Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but
are reviewed for correctness, Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
5.

Statement of Issue. Whether a court may refuse to grant a partial new trial and

consider the testimony of six individuals which establishes that the Court's ruling was obtained
through perjury when the testimony of the individuals was timely offered pursuant to Rules 59
and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; particularly when the perjured testimony concerned a
transaction which did not involve the appellant and the perjured testimony prevented the
appellant from discovering facts essential to the case.
Standard of Review. A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial will
not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Christenson v. Jewkes. 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah, 1988). If the lower court granted the motion for new trial, the appellate court
will sustain that decision if the record contains "substantial competent evidence which would
support a verdict for the [moving party]." Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 P.2d at 730, 732 (Utah 1982).
6.

Statement of Issue. Whether a court may accept the estimate of the fair market

value of a home from a homeowner who does not know the square footage of his home and is
unfamiliar with real estate transactions; when all other evidence indicates the home is worth
substantially more than the amount estimated by the homeowner.
Standard of Review. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but
are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068. 1070 (Utah 1985). "Atrial
court's findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, will not be set aside on
appeal unless clearly erroneous." Gravson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d
-2-

467, 470 (Utah 1989). "A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of evidence
or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made."
Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). "A mixed question of law and fact is one
in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed and the
issue is whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. State v.
Vigil 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).
7.

Statement of Issue. Whether a judgment should be allowed to stand when the

judgment is not supported by the evidence.
Standard of Review. The appellate court will reverse if "viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, [the court] conclude[s] that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE LAW:
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 eLseg.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the judgment entered by the lower court on July 29, 1996, wherein
the court awarded damages in the amount of $193,000 to defendants based on plaintiffs alleged
tortious interference with defendants' contract to sell their home, and upon the court's finding
-3-

that the plaintiff owed defendant $23,000 due to a breach of warranty and based upon the Court's
ruling that the Contract between the parties was that the Appellant would build a home for
Appellee for a fixed amount rather than on a cost-plus basis. (R. 408.)
Appellant is also appealing the trial court's order denying appellant's request for the court
to take additional testimony which establishes that Mr. Mattson knowingly testified falsely
before the court and obtained a judgment based upon false testimony. In denying appellant's
motion, the trial court held that Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony should have been discovered
prior to or during trial. (R. 401.)
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below.

This action stems from a breach of contract action filed by ProMax against the Mattsons
wherein ProMax alleged that it built a home for the Mattsons on a cost-plus basis whereby the
Mattsons would pay for the expense of the home and ProMax would be paid a $10,000 fee for
overseeing the construction of the home. (R. 2.) On March 12 and 13, 1996, a trial on this
matter was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. (R.77.)
On March 18, 1996, Judge Frederick issued a ruling from the bench awarding damages to
the Mattsons in the amount of $193,000. The award of damages constituted $170,000 for
tortious interference with the contract for the sale of the Mattsons' home and $23,000 for
damages due to defective workmanship on the basis that such amount was owed because the
contract to build the house was to be for a set fee. (R. 778.)
On June 10, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for partial new trial, requesting that the court
take additional evidence which establishes that Matt Mattson offered perjured testimony during
-4-

trial, and that the Court's judgment was improper in other respects. (R. 157-159.) After the
appropriate memoranda were filed by both parties, the court denied plaintiffs motion on the
basis that such evidence was untimely. (R. 401.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

Appellant ProMax entered into a contract with the Mattsons whereby ProMax agreed to
act as general contractor relating to a residence to be constructed for the Mattsons at 6642 Stone
Mill Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 2.)
Under the terms of the contract, ProMax was to provide construction supervision
services, obtain subcontractors and otherwise supervise the construction of the residence on the
property and the Mattsons were to pay ProMax an amount equal to all of ProMax's actual costs
payable to subcontractors together with a construction supervision fee in the amount of $10,000.
(R. 2.)
The Mattsons failed to pay subcontractors, materialmen and labor men in the amount of
$9,475.42 which amounts ProMax was forced to pay. The Mattsons also failed to pay ProMax
$5,058 of its construction management fee for a total amount due and owing to ProMax of
$14,533.42. (R.2.)
The Mattsons therefore breached their contract with ProMax by paying only a portion of
the $10,000 builder's fee and by failing to pay $14,533.42 as required pursuant to the terms of
the contract. (R. 2.)
Upon completion of the home, the home was part of the Parade of Homes where it won
the People's Choice Award. Wasatch Realty Group was involved in preparing the marketing for
-5-

the Mattson home during the Parade of Homes. At some time during the Parade of Homes, the
employees of Wasatch Realty Group were informed that the home was being offered for sale at a
price of $550,000, which included the furnishings of the home. (R. 166 and 189.)
One afternoon, Phil Bates of ProMax asked Laurie Gale to hold the model open while he
left to receive the "People's Choice" award for the Mattson home. While at the front door, a man
named Curtis Johnsen asked Ms. Gale the price of the home. She informed Mr. Johnsen that the
price of the home was $550,000. Mr. Johnsen stated that he was interested in buying the home.
(R. 167 and 189.)
Ms. Gale and Mr. Johnsen set up an appointment for later that afternoon to meet with
Mr. Johnsen and his wife at Ms. Gale's office. At that time, Ms. Gale wrote up an offer on the
home. After informing Mr. Mattson that Mr. Johnsen made an offer on the home, Mr. Mattson
made a counteroffer of $565,000 because he claimed the furniture was more expensive than he
had originally thought. A standard form purchase money agreement was then drawn up and
signed by Mr. Johnsen on August 28, 1993. (R. 167 and 190.)
Shortly after Mr. Johnsen signed the Earnest Money Agreement, a meeting was scheduled
at the Mattson home to conduct a walk-through inspection of the home. (R. 169 and 190.)
Upon arriving at the home, Ms. Gale began the walk-through with the Johnsens. Upon
inspecting the basement of the home, Ms. Gale and the Johnsens saw Sherie Mattson doing some
cleaning work and her children were wearing swimsuits and playing in the hot tub. (R. 169 and
190.)
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At that time, Ms. Mattson informed Ms. Gale and the Johnsens that the Mattsons had
decided not to sell the home. Ms. Gale then spoke with Mr. Mattson over the telephone and he
confirmed that the Mattsons had decided not to sell the home because they had attended church
and made friends with the neighbors and that their children were already enrolled in the schools
for that area and that they had become attached. (R. 169-170 and 190-191.)
A material term of the Earnest Money Agreement was that the offer must be accepted
in writing by August 30, 1993, as follows:
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE.
Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller
shall have until 12:00 noon, August 30, 1993, to accept this offer. Unless
accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST
MONEY to the Buyer.
(R. 415 and 422-425. A copy of the Earnest Money Agreement is included in the addendum.)
The Earnest Money Agreement contained a space which specifically provided for the
sellers' signatures signifying acceptance of the offer. Mr. and Mrs. Mattson never signed the
Earnest Money Agreement. The offer of the Johnsens therefore expired on August 30, 1993
at 12:00 noon without being accepted by the Mattsons. The home was, therefore, not purchased
by the Johnsens. (R. 415 and 424.)
According to Mr. Johnsen, the reasons they decided not to buy the Mattson home were as
follows:
3.
During the process of negotiating a purchase price for the home,
Mrs. Mattson informed us that they no longer wanted to sell the home.

-7-

5.
My wife and I did not purchase the home owned by the Mattsons
due to two reasons: (1) they told us they no longer desired to sell the home; and
(2) we were not able to come up with sufficient funds to buy the home.
6.
During the time that my wife and I were considering purchasing
the home from the Mattsons, we were not made aware that any liens existed on
the home and the existence of such liens in no way influenced our decision not to
purchase the home.
(R. 338-39.)
On September 1 and 2, 1993, after Mr. Johnsen's offer had expired, six subcontractors
filed liens on the Mattson home. (R. 649-650.)
On or about August 3, 1994, ProMax filed a Complaint against the Mattsons for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment in the amount of $14,533.42. (R. 1.)
On October 11, 1994, the Mattsons filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim which
contained eleven causes of action against ProMax, which included the following: (1) breach of
contract; (2) breach of implied and express warranties; (3) misrepresentation; (4) fraudulent
inducement; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) interference with contractual
relations; (7) extortion; (8) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (9) slander;
(10) conversion; and (11) slander of title. (R. 12-36.)
Prior to trial, ProMax, through formal discovery, requested all documents which the
Mattsons would use at trial. The Mattsons, however, did not provide the Earnest Money
Agreement signed by Curtis Johnsen on August 28, 1993, which was ultimately relied upon by
the trial court in awarding $170,000 for tortious interference with contractual relations. (R. 416,
436-37 and 776.)
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At trial, ProMax called Mark Barraclough, a former loan officer with Fair West Bank, as •
its witness to testify regarding the loan relating to the Mattson home. (R. 471.)
Mr. Barraclough testified that the terms of the contract between ProMax and the Mattsons
were that the house would be built on a cost-plus basis. Although the loan was made for an
established dollar amount, Mr. Barraclough testified the loan amount was merely a target figure
which was to be supplemented by future additions. Mr. Barraclough also testified that cost-plus
agreements are very common and that they are usually left open-ended and usually are not
reduced to writing. (R. 197, 198, 476, 481, 484, 485.)
Phil Bates and Culley Davis concurred with Mr. Barraclough's testimony that the
agreement between ProMax and the Mattsons was that the home would be built on a cost-plus
basis. (R. 562, 751, 764.) Conversely, Mr. Mattson testified that the agreement was that ProMax
would build the home, which is over 7,000 square feet, for a set fee of approximately $156,200.
(R. 637, 638.)
With respect to the issue of the failed sale of the Mattson home, Mr. Mattson testified that
after executing a valid and binding contract with Curtis Johnsen, Mr. Johnsen refused to purchase
the Mattson home because certain materialmen had filed liens upon the home and such liens
were allegedly filed at the direction of Mr. Bates. (R. 651.)
Because ProMax was not a party to the agreement involving Curtis Johnsen and the
Mattsons for the sale of the Mattson home, ProMax was unaware of the reason that the sale
failed. (R. 423, 547.) ProMax accepted Mr. Mattson's testimony as true that the sale failed due
to the filing of liens. ProMax's prior counsel did not obtain the testimony of Curtis Johnsen or
-9-

the real estate agents involved with the sale. At trial, ProMax offered Mr. Bates' testimony to
refute Mr. Mattson's claim that the sale failed due to the filing of liens. ProMax also contended
that Mr. Bates did not cause the sale of the Mattson home to fail and offered testimony in that
regard. (R. 546-47.)
During trial, Mr. Mattson testified that he incurred approximately $23,000 in expenses
due to cost overruns and defective workmanship performed by ProMax. (R. 665.) This
testimony was given in spite of the fact that he claimed only $15,000 in cost overruns in his
deposition. (R. 91.)
On March 18, 1996, the judge issued a ruling from the bench and awarded judgment
against ProMax in the amount of $193,000. The judgment constituted $170,000 for Phil Bates'
alleged interference with the sale of the Mattson home because Mr. Bates allegedly had six
subcontractors file mechanic's liens prior to demanding payment. The Court also awarded
$23,000 for expenses incurred due to defective workmanship. (R. 772-780.)
Following the trial, ProMax retained new counsel. Upon review of the trial transcript,
ProMax's new counsel identified several errors and inconsistencies in the court's ruling.
ProMax's counsel also discovered that the sale of the Mattson home did not fail due to the
actions of Phil Bates. Rather, the sale did not go through because the Mattsons told the
prospective buyer that they did not want to sell the home because the prospective buyer did not
have sufficient funds for the purchase of the home and because the Mattsons never accepted the
buyer's offer. (R. 338-339.)
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ProMax's counsel also discovered that the court misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's
testimony at trial and apparently granted judgment against ProMax based on its
misunderstanding of Mr. Barraclough's testimony. ProMax's counsel further discovered that
even if Mr. Bates did cause the sale to fail, (which he didn't) the damages awarded for the failed
sale of the home were excessive. (R. 193-195.)
On June 10, 1996, ProMax filed a Motion for Partial New Trial, which presented
evidence that unequivocally showed that contrary to Mr. Mattson's testimony, the sale of the
Mattson home did not fail due to the actions of Mr. Bates; rather, the sale failed because the
Mattsons did not want to sell the home and the potential buyer did not have sufficient funds to
purchase the home. (R. 157, 338-39.)
In spite of the fact that ProMax submitted an affidavit of Mark Barraclough which
clarified the court's misunderstanding of his testimony and reaffirmed that the home was to be
built upon a cost-plus basis, and the affidavits of five individuals who were directly involved
with the sale of the home, who all unequivocally stated that Phil Bates had nothing to do with the
failed sale, and who all indicate that the Court's verdict was based upon perjured testimony by
Mr. Mattson, the court refused to grant plaintiffs request for the court to take additional
evidence which is appropriate pursuant to Rules 59 and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R.401.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THE OFFER TO PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED
WITHOUT BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MATTSONS.

The trial court's award of $170,000 due to the alleged tortious interference by Mr. Bates
with the sale of the Mattson home is improper because Mr. Bates could not have interfered with a
contract that, as a matter of law, never existed. The Earnest Money Agreement required that the
prospective purchaser's offer by accepted in writing by August 30, 1993. This was never done.
Therefore, there never was a valid contract for the sale of the Mattson's home. Thus, the court's
finding that a valid and binding contract existed was erroneous.

II.

NO VALID CONTRACT EXISTED FOR THE SALE OF THE
MATTSON HOME.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 require that contracts for the sale of real estate be
in writing. The written acceptance required by the contract was never formally reduced to
writing. Therefore, the Court's finding that a valid and binding contract was entered into was
erroneous.
The statute of frauds is a defense available to ProMax even though it was not asserted in
its Reply to the Mattsons' counterclaim because the Mattsons never produced a writing pursuant
to the discovery requests and ProMax was therefore unaware that the statute of frauds was at
issue until ProMax was surprised by the Earnest Money Agreement at trial.
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III.

THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE FILED AFTER THE OFFER TO
PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED.

Mr. Johnsen's offer to purchase the Mattson home expired on August 30, 1993, without
being accepted by the Mattsons. On September 1, 1993 and September 2, 1993, liens were filed
by subcontractors against the Mattson property. These liens were not a factor in the failed sale of
the Mattson home as testified by Curtis Johnsen, the prospective buyer. Moreover, the offer had
already expired at the time the liens were filed. Therefore, the liens had no effect on the failure
of the sale.

IV.

THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE
WRONGFULLY FILED IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The trial court specifically found that Mr. Bates had caused the mechanic's liens to be
"wrongfully filed" because the liens were filed without the subcontractors first making demands
for payment. However, the mechanic's lien statute in Utah does not require that a contractor or
subcontractor make a demand for payment before filing a mechanic's lien.
The mechanic's lien statute was enacted for the protection of contractors and
subcontractors. Such liens are filed routinely and are not generally viewed as a significant cloud
on the title of new homes. No evidence was presented that the liens were invalid or unwarranted.
Therefore, the Court's ruling that the liens were wrongfully filed was incorrect as a matter of
law.

-13-

V.

EVEN IF THERE WERE A VALID CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
THE MATTSON HOME. PHIL BATES DID NOT CAUSE THE SALE
TO FAIL.

Curtis Johnsen, the individual who offered to purchase the Mattson home, submitted an
affidavit stating that the reason the sale of the home failed was that the Mattsons did not want to
sell the home and that the Johnsens were not able to come up with the money to purchase the
home. The testimony of five other people familiar with the alleged sale supports Mr. Johnsen's
testimony. Conversely, the only individual testifying that Phil Bates caused the sale of the home
to fail was Mr. Mattson. The record is replete with examples of Mr. Mattson knowingly offering
false testimony. Therefore the court's acceptance of Mr. Mattson's testimony over a mountain of
evidence contradicting his testimony was erroneous.

VI.

EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME. THE $170.000 AWARD IS
EXCESSIVE.

The trial court allowed Mr. Mattson to offer his opinion regarding the market value of his
home in spite of the fact that Mr. Mattson admitted he had no experience with real estate and did
not even know the square footage of his home. If a person does not have a realistic idea of the
value of the property, the owner's testimony has no probative use and should be deemed
incompetent.
The court determined that the value of the home was $390,000, and on that basis,
awarded the Mattsons $170,000 for the failed sale of their home. However, the only evidence
supporting the court's determination of $390,000 was Mr. Mattson's own self-serving testimony.
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The $390,000 value was essentially what the home cost, which is not an appropriate market
value determination.
ProMax submitted, and the evidence, including admissions from Mattsons and their
counsel, substantiates that the home was worth substantially more than $390,000. Therefore,
even if Phil Bates were the cause of the failed sale of the Mattson home, the court erred in
awarding excessive damages.

VII. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS WAS
THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME FOR
COST PLUS $10,000.
The trial court misinterpreted or disregarded the testimony concerning the agreement to
construct the Mattson home. Most notably are the court's misinterpretation of Mr. Barraclough's
testimony and the court's misinterpretation of the construction cost breakdown.
Mr. Barraclough testified that the home was to be built on a cost-plus basis. However,
the court's decision focused on ambiguous statements by Mr. Barraclough, which were later
clarified in Mr. Barraclough's Affidavit. Nonetheless, the court disregarded much of Mr.
Barraclough's testimony that the home was to be built on a cost-plus basis and instead,
determined that the home was to be built for a set fee in the amount of approximately $156,200
for a home in excess of 7,000 square feet.
The court also misinterpreted the construction cost breakdown list by ruling that the
agreement for construction loan was to be for $190,200. The construction cost breakdown
clearly shows that of the $190,200, $29,000 was toward the cost of the lot and $5,000 was for
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loan costs. Thus, according to the court's interpretation of the testimony the contract was for no
more than approximately $156,200. The court's ruling is not supported by the evidence or
common logic. The court certainly would have been less likely to believe Mr. Mattson's
testimony if the court had understood it was ruling that the agreement was to build the home for
$156,000 instead of $190,000.

VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

The March 18 ruling by the court, coupled with the Findings of Fact and the Judgment,
clearly contradict the evidence submitted at the trial. The court's ruling contradicts the record,
including, but not limited to, the following items and issues:
1.

the court misinterpreted the cost breakdown for the Mattson home;

2.

the Mattsons did not ask for a written contract;

3.

the court misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's testimony;

4.

the value of the home at completion was far in excess of $390,000;

5.

change orders do not need to be written;

6.

the court's ruling regarding the failed sale of the Mattson home was

clearly erroneous;
7.

the Mattsons never accepted the Johnsens' offer to purchase their home;

8.

making a demand for payment is not a pre-requisite to filing a mechanic's

9.

the sale of the Mattson home did not fail because of the mechanic's liens;

lien;
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10.

the court miscalculated the cost overruns;

11.

the court misconstrued Culley Davis' testimony; and

12.

the court improperly held that the parties stipulated that cost overruns

existed.

IX.

RULE 59fa\ UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. ALLOWS THE
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

The court denied ProMax's motion for partial new trial to take additional evidence on the
basis that the evidence presented in conjunction with ProMax's motion and memorandum should
have purportedly been discovered at trial. However, Rules 59 and 60, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, clearly provide that a partial new trial under the circumstances in this case was
appropriate.
This case involved perjured testimony, substantial evidence that the court's judgment was
incorrect, that ProMax was surprised at trial by the earnest money agreement, which it had never
previously been provided, that newly discovered evidence existed, that excessive damage
existed, that the evidence was insufficient and that the court made errors of law.
ProMax's motion for a partial new trial was appropriate under both Rule 59 and 60.
Moreover, the evidence and the proffered testimony in this case were sufficient to compel the
court to grant ProMax's motion.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE OFFER TO PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED
WITHOUT BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MATTSONS.

The trial court awarded damages due to Phil Bates' alleged tortious interference with the
sale of the Mattson home. Based on the Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit 54) and the
testimony of Matt Mattson that the Mattsons had a contract with Curtis Johnsen to sell their
home, and upon Mr. Mattson's testimony that Phil Bates allegedly tortiously interfered with the
sale of the Mattson home, the trial court awarded damages to defendants in the amount of
$170,000 due to Mr. Bates' alleged tortious interference with the sale of the Mattson home.
However, there was no valid contract for the sale of the Mattson home because the written offer
to purchase the Mattson home expired without being accepted. (See Exhibit 54, included in the
addendum.) The Mattsons' claim for interference with the contract for the sale of the home
should have failed as a matter of basic contract law at the trial level.
Phil Bates could not have interfered with a contract that, as a matter of law, never existed.
The offer, as contained in the Earnest Money Agreement, expired pursuant to its own terms on
August 30, 1993, as follows:
Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller
shall have until 12:00 noon, Aug. 30, 1993, to accept this offer. Unless accepted,
this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the Earnest Money to the Buyer.
The Earnest Money Agreement contains the signature of Curtis Johnsen, but lacks the
required signatures of Matt and Sherie Mattson. (See Exhibit 54, addendum.) .
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In its March 18 ruling, the Court found that "[o]n August 28th, 1993 . . . Defendants
accepted the offer." (R. 776.) There was no testimony or evidence presented at trial which
substantiates the Court's finding that the offer was accepted on August 28, 1993. Conversely,
the Earnest Money Agreement clearly illustrates that the offer was never accepted.
To be formally accepted, the offer contained in the Earnest Money Agreement needed to
be signed by the Mattsons before noon August 30, 1993, which was never done. Thus, the offer
of Mr. Johnsen expired at noon on August 30, 1993. Phil Bates and ProMax, therefore, could not
be legally responsible for the failed sale because there was never a binding contract for the sale
of the home.

II.

NO VALID CONTRACT EXISTED FOR THE SALE OF THE
MATTSON HOME.

Not only does the trial court's award for tortious interference with contractual relations
fail due to the absence of a contract, but also the Earnest Money Agreement fails to comply with
the statute of frauds. To have a valid contract for the sale of real property, the sale must be
reduced to writing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and 25-5-3, which read as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of
any lands, or anv interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note
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or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (emphasis added).
Sections 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 mandate "expressly that a document to be enforceable under
the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party granting the conveyance." Williams v.
Singleton. 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1996).
In rendering the judgment, the Court relied upon Exhibit 54, a standard earnest money
agreement. However, Exhibit 54 was not signed by either of the Mattsons.1 Accordingly,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, there was no writing to validate a contract for the sale of
the Mattson home.
Additionally, Mr. Mattson's own testimony indicates that the Earnest Money Agreement
does not signify the final terms of sale discussed by the parties. Mr. Mattson testified that after
the offer of $565,000 was presented, a counter-offer of $550,000 was presented and agreed upon.
(R. 698-99.) The Earnest Money Agreement makes no mention of the $550,000 counteroffer.
The Court's award of damages was therefore, not only improper under the Earnest Money
Agreement, but also was not even based upon the agreement that Mr. Mattson described. Thus,
pursuant to the statute of frauds, the Mattsons' claim fails as a matter of law.
The Mattsons may argue that ProMax is barred from asserting the statute of frauds
because it failed to plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense in its reply to the
Mattsons' counterclaim. However, the statute of frauds was not set forth in the reply to the
*Mr. Mattson testified at trial that he signed the Earnest Money Agreement. However,
this statement is false. Mr. Mattson did not sign the Earnest Money Agreement. (R. 91 at 96.)
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Mattsons' counterclaim because ProMax was unaware that a written agreement existed or, that if
a written agreement did exist, that it was defective. Through formal written discovery, ProMax
should have discovered that a written agreement existed and that the statute of frauds was a
defense. However, in spite of the fact that ProMax requested such documents pursuant to formal
discovery requests, the Mattsons never provided such documents. (R. 416, 436-37.)
Pursuant to a document request filed on January 6, 1995, plaintiff requested all
documents to be used as exhibits in this trial. (R. 416, 436-37.) In spite of being duty-bound to
deliver the Earnest Money Agreement pursuant to the discovery requests, defendants failed to do
so. At trial, when defendants' counsel attempted to introduce Exhibit 54 as an exhibit, plaintiffs
counsel objected on the basis that such a document had been requested, but had not been
produced. (R. 559-560.) The Mattsons can point to no evidence which indicates that they
produced the Earnest Money Agreement.
The Mattsons should, therefore, be allowed to assert the statute of frauds as a defense
because the Mattsons' actions prevented ProMax from examining the Earnest Money Agreement
and therefore from being able to appropriately assert the statute of frauds.

III.

THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE FILED AFTER THE OFFER TO
PURCHASE THE MATTSONS' HOME EXPIRED.

Mr. Johnsen's offer to purchase the Mattson home expired on August 30, 1993, without
being accepted by the Mattsons. Mr. Mattson testified that Mr. Bates called Mr. Mattson on
August 31. 1993. and inquired whether Mr. Mattson was going to "cut [Mr. Bates] out of the
deal" by not using Mr. Bates as his selling broker. (R. 647-48.) Upon being informed by Mr.
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Mattson that Mr. Bates was not going to be used as a broker, Mr. Mattson testified that Mr. Bates
stated that he would kill Mr. Mattson's deal. (R. 649.)
Thereafter, on September 1, 1993 and September 2, 1993, six liens were filed by
subcontractors. (R. 650.)2 Based upon this information, the trial court awarded damages to the
Mattsons in the amount of $170,000 for tortious interference by Mr. Bates with respect to the
sale of the Mattson home. (R. 779.) The trial court's award of damages, however, was
erroneous.
Not only did Mr. Johnsen, the prospective purchaser, testify in his affidavit that the liens
were not the cause of the failed sale, but even if the mechanic's liens were filed at the direction
of Mr. Bates, Mr. Bates could not be held legally responsible for interfering with a contract that,
as a matter of law, did not exist because the offer to purchase expired without being accepted.

IV.

THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE VALID AND PROPER.

The purpose of the mechanic's lien statute is "remedial in nature and seeks to provide
protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the value of the property of
another by their materials or labor." Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738,
743 (Utah 1990). The mechanic's lien statute is to be liberally construed, and the "modern trend
is to dispense with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact
situation." Id, at 744 (quoting Consolidated Electric Distributors. Inc. v. Jepson Electric

2

Although Mr. Mattson testified that the liens were filed on September 1, and 2, the liens
were actually filed on September 2, and 3, 1993. (Exhibits 44-48 are included in the
Addendum.)
-22-

Contracting. Inc.. 537 P.2d 80, 83 (Or. 1975)). As such, minor technical insufficiencies will not
defeat the mechanic's lien unless they have "compromised a purpose of the mechanic's lien
statute." Id
The trial court specifically found that Mr. Bates caused the mechanic's liens against the
property to be "wrongfully filed" because the subcontractors did not first make demand for
payment. (R. 406, 776, 779.) This finding, however, is erroneous because the Utah Mechanic's
Lien Statute imposes no requirement to demand payment before filing a lien. The Utah
Mechanics' Lien statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished....
Utah Code Ann., §38-1-3. Thus, a mechanic's lien automatically arises in favor of one who
performs labor or provides materials upon real property, as long as the claimant complies with
the statute. Section 38-1-7 then requires the lien claimant to record a written notice to hold and
claim a lien within 90 days from the date labor was last performed or materials furnished on the
project. The statute does not require anywhere that a claimant must first make demand for
payment in order to be entitled to and assert a mechanic's lien. No Utah cases have interpreted
the statute to include such a requirement. The claimant must only comply with the plain
language of the statute. See First Security Mortgage Company v. Hansen. 631 P.2d 919, 922
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(Utah 1981). Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the lien was "wrongfully filed" was
incorrect.

V.

EVEN IF THERE WERE A VALID CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
THE MATTSON HOME. PHIL BATES DID NOT CAUSE THE SALE
TO FAIL.

Mr. Mattson testified that the Johnsens did not purchase the home because liens were
filed on the home. (R. 649-52, 779, 91 at 97-98 and 109.) However, along with Phil Bates, five
additional people, including the potential buyers (Curtis Johnsen, Nancy Johnsen, Laurie Gale,
Marty Gale and Greg Fabiano), all with nothing at stake in this litigation and all familiar with the
transaction involving the sale of the Mattson home, unequivocally state that Phil Bates had
nothing to do with the failed sale of the Mattson home. (R. 151, 171, 181, 338-39, 340-41.)
Curtis Johnsen, the potential buyer, states as follows:
3.
During the process of negotiating a purchase price for the home,
Mrs. Mattson informed us that they no longer wanted to sell the home.

5.
My wife and I did not purchase the home owned by the Mattsons
due to two reasons: (1) they told us they no longer desired to sell the home; and
(2) we were not able to come up with sufficient funds to buy the home.
6.
During the time that my wife and I were considering purchasing
the home from the Mattsons, we were not made aware that any liens existed on
the home and the existence of such liens in no way influenced our decision not to
purchase the home.
(R. 338-39.)
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The only witness supporting defendants' connection regarding the failed sale is
Mr. Mattson, whose testimony appears to be perjured. At best, Mr. Mattson might argue that he
was mistaken. But relief from a judgment based upon mistake is also appropriate. Gillmor v.
Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Utah 1993).
Because $170,000 was awarded on what six people claim is perjured testimony, it was
not unreasonable to ask the trial court to reexamine the evidence and change its ruling. See
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); overruled on other grounds (when
there is substantial evidence showing a reasonable basis to support a verdict in favor of the party
moving for a new trial, there is no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial); In re Cook. 527
A.2d 1115, 1116 (Pa. 1987) ("when the Court determines that perjury has been committed, it is
within the Court's discretion to grant a new trial"). The trial court should have ruled on the
merits of the additional evidence presented by plaintiff instead of denying plaintiffs motion for
the court to take additional evidence.

VI.

EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME, THE $170.000 AWARD IS
EXCESSIVE.

As a general rule, "[A] knowledgeable owner is competent to give evidence on the
market value of his real property." See Terry v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1981)
(emphasis added). In this case, however, Mr. Mattson's testimony indicates that he was not
qualified to give an opinion regarding the market value of his home. If a person does not have a
realistic idea of the value of the property, the owner's testimony has no probative use and should
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be deemed incompetent. Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch. 533 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah
1975).
During the trial, Mr. Mattson admitted that he had no previous experience with bidding or
building a home. (R. 635.) Mr. Mattson also admitted that he didn't even know the square
footage of his home, by stating as follows:
Q:

Would you agree with me that your home is approximately 7,113 square
feet?

A:

I really don't know to be quite honest with you.

(R. 702, 687.) An owner cannot give a realistic opinion of market value if he doesn't even know
the size of the home. "[M]ere ownership does not render a person competent to render an
opinion as to value, unless he is in fact familiar with facts which give the property value." Utah
State Road Commission v. Johnson. 550 P.2d 216, 220 (Utah 1976).
When asked his opinion regarding the value of his home, Mr. Mattson answered,
"[p]robably 390, 395." (R. 678-79.) Mr. Mattson's estimate of the market value of his home is
essentially what the home cost. However, "[wr]hat the property is worth to a seller is not a
correct basis for the opinion." Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson. 550 P.2d 216, 217
(Utah 1976). Mr. Mattson's offering the cost of the home as estimated market value does not
even consider the savings of 10-12% profit that a contractor normally receives on such a job as
testified by Culley Davis. (R. 751.) Using the cost of the home as the estimated market value is
improper and even if it were a proper method of valuation, the value would surely have to
include cost savings, which Mr. Mattson's estimate failed to consider.
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By citing the price of the home as the market value of the home, Mr. Mattson failed to
take into account the numerous discounts he received on the home, which by his own testimony
reduced the cost of the home by 40%. (R. 661.) Such discounts include, but are not limited to,
the following: (1) $10,000 worth of free countertops (R. 542); (2) a free fire alarm equaling a
$4,500 savings (R. 565); (3) discounts on roofing materials (R. 568); (4) free plumbing (R. 570);
(5) substantial discounts on soffit and fascia (R. 572); (6) discounts on carpet (R. 572-73); (7)
discounts on brick (R. 573); (8) possible discounts on the pool (R. 687-88); and (9) 50% savings
on a sauna (R. 750). The Mattsons' own attorney admits "there were some things [the Mattsons]
got for free." (R. 570-71.)
By offering the approximate cost of the home as the estimated market value, Mr. Mattson
also failed to inform the Court that in early 1994 the house was appraised at approximately
$450,000. (R. 91 at 80-81 and 135.) Another appraisal was obtained establishing the 1993 value
of the home at approximately $465,000. (R. 247.)
The Mattsons' attorney also makes several assertions that the market value of the home is
between $450,000 and $560,000. (R. 581 and 586.) In spite of this substantial evidence that
indicates the home was worth substantially more than $390,000, including a written offer for
$565,000, the trial court disregarded the evidence and instead relied on Mr. Mattson's selfserving statement that the home was worth $390,000 when finished.
The transaction involving Curtis Johnsen also appears to have included the furnishings
that were in the home during the Parade of Homes. (R. 150 and 181.) Therefore, a portion of the
purchase price would have been for the furnishings. Accordingly, the value of the furnishings
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should have been established in order to determine the price to be paid for the house and the
price to be paid for the furnishings. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that Mr.
Mattson owns a furniture store and most likely would have had top quality furniture in the home
for purposes of advertisement. In fact, Mr. Mattson stated that one leather sofa in the home was
worth over $20,000. (R. 166.)
Moreover, if the Earnest Money Agreement were valid, which it is not due to the statute
of frauds, the Earnest Money Agreement provides that three percent of the purchase price, or
$16,950, was to be paid in commission to Laurie Gale. (See Exhibit 54 in addendum.) The
$16,950 commission due to Laurie Gale is money that the Mattsons would have never received if
the home had been sold to the Johnsens and the $16,950 should not have been awarded to the
Mattsons. In sum, even if the Mattsons were entitled to damages relating to the failed sale of
their home, the Mattsons should not have been awarded the difference between $390,000 and
$560,000.

VII. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS WAS
THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME FOR
COST PLUS $10.000.
At trial, the parties disputed the type of contract that existed for building the Mattson
home. ProMax contended that the terms of the contract were that the Mattsons would pay for
expenses plus pay ProMax a $10,000 fee. Conversely, Mr. Mattson contended that ProMax was
to build the home, in excess of 7,000 square feet, for approximately $156,200.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Mattsons on this issue. In reviewing the record, it is
clear that the basis for the Court's decision is derived from the Court's misunderstanding the
-28-

testimony of ProMax's first and most important witness, Mark Barraclough, the loan officer who
handled the construction loan with Matt Mattson. The Court ruled that the contract between
Matt Mattson and ProMax was a fixed amount and not a cost-plus contract.
Upon reviewing the trial transcript, plaintiffs new counsel noticed that the questions
presented to Mr. Barraclough and his resulting answers were ambiguous. It was also apparent
that the trial court misunderstood or chose to ignore the salient portion of Mr. Barraclough's
testimony. ProMax's counsel then contacted Mr. Barraclough, at which time Mr. Barraclough
clarified his testimony which was subsequently submitted to the Court in the form of an affidavit
in connection with ProMax's 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment. In the trial court's March 18,
1996 ruling from the bench, the judge stated:
Mark Barraclough, the former loan officer of Fair West Bank who handled the
construction loan, stated in his deposition that "we went in for a certain dollar figure to
accommodate the builder and the borrower." He further testified that in his 18 years as a
construction loan officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely rare and he had only seen
approximately six of them, and moreover, that he would not have authorized an arbitrary price
for construction.
(R. 775.) This does not comport with Mr. Barraclough's testimony. As clarified in his
subsequent affidavit, Mr. Barraclough did make reference to a "certain dollar amount"; however,
he was referring to the loan amount. The loan amount was to be a certain amount. It is
understood that custom home contracts have undefined variables that are frequently changed.
With respect to the Mattson loan, Mr. Barraclough testified at trial and continues to maintain
"that the home was to be built on a cost-plus [basis]..." (R. 161, 476.)

-29-

Mr. Barraclough's affidavit also clarified the Court's confusion regarding
Mr. Barraclough's testimony contained in the Trial Transcript. The Court stated that in Mr.
Barraclough's "18 years as a construction loan officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely rare
and he had only seen approximately six of them . . . " (R. 775.) This is not true. Cost-plus
agreements are very common. In fact, on average, Mr. Barraclough sees approximately one or
two cost-plus contracts a week in his current job as a loan officer for Republic Mortgage. When
he worked at Far West Bank, Mr. Barraclough worked almost exclusively with cost-plus
contracts which were usually open-ended and not written. (R. 161-62.)
Mr. Barraclough clarified his testimony to alleviate the Court's confusion. The relevant
colloquy clarified by Mr. Barraclough from the trial transcript is as follows:
Q:

And careful builders are clear typically to say that it is a cost-plus when
it's a cost-plus, and that is typically in the papers, correct?

A:

I disagree. With the people that I work with, that is not a normal way of
doing business.

Q:

It's your experience that they're left open?

A:

Pretty much.

Q:

and those open-ended contracts don't say cost-plus?

A:

I assume probably in my 18 years of cost-plus contracts, maybe a half a
dozen at most.

Q:

Haifa dozen? That's it?

A:

Yeah.

Q:

Okay, and out of those half a dozen, don't those typically say that they're
cost-plus?
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A:

Yes.

(R. 484-85.)
Mr. Barraclough testified that cost-plus agreements are typically left open. He testified
that in his 18 years of cost-plus contracts, only approximately half a dozen of the open-ended
cost-plus contracts were actually written and actually said cost-plus. Mr. Barraclough's affidavit
establishes that he wasn't saying that he had only dealt with a half dozen cost-plus contracts.
Furthermore, Mr. Barraclough did not testify that he would not have authorized an
arbitrary price for construction as the Court stated by the Court in its March 18 ruling. At trial,
Mr. Barraclough stated that he would authorize a price knowing there was going to be over-runs
if "we knew certain variables." (R. 163.) Such variables were known in this case and such a
transaction was authorized by Mr. Barraclough. (R. 163.)
Another misunderstanding of the trial court is evidenced by the Court's statement that
"notwithstanding the financing documents with the bank specifying the price of $190,200 for the
construction itself." (R. 74.) The cost of construction itself was not $190,000. The construction
cost breakdown for the Mattson home (Exhibit 21) clearly shows that $29,000 of the $190,200
was to be for one-half of the lot. (A copy of Exhibit 21 is included in the addendum.) Another
$5,000 was for the construction loan costs. The Court's holding that the price for construction
only was $190,200 is therefore incorrect. Under the Court's interpretation, the cost for
construction only would have been a mere $156,000. The Court certainly would have been less
likely to believe Mr. Mattson's testimony if the Court had realized Mr. Mattson was claiming the
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home was to be built for approximately $156,000, which the Court obviously did not comprehend. Clearly, the Court did not fully comprehend the evidence regarding the value of the home.
It is also a clear error to suppose that a contractor would build an award-winning house in
excess of 7,000 square feet for the price of $156,200, which is actually what the court's
interpretation of the construction cost breakdown would indicate. From this evidence and the
evidence offered at trial, including Mr. Mattson's testimony regarding the numerous unsettled
variables and subsequent additions, it is obvious that the construction cost breakdown was to be
used merely as a starting point, with subsequent additions to take place.
In connection with ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial, the trial court was presented
with affidavits of several other individuals which supported ProMax's contention that the
Contract between ProMax and the Mattsons was cost plus a $10,000 fee. (R. 330-353.) The
Affidavit of Randell Silcox establishes that cost-plus agreements are common in the construction
industry. Mr. Silcox's affidavit states that a large portion of the loans for custom-built homes
that he has been involved with relied on contracts which were cost-plus. (R. 178.) Mr. Silcox
also states that "contracts usually involve a set amount for purposes of the loan, with the
understanding that the parties will make changes to that amount according to their preferences
regarding material, additions, etc." (R. 178.)
Mr. Silcox, in fact, assisted Rick Raile and Phil Bates of ProMax in executing a loan that
involved a cost-plus agreement. (R. 178.) This contradicts the testimony offered in favor of the
Mattsons by the Railes at the trial.
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As additional evidence that the Contract was to be cost-plus, the trial court was provided
with the affidavits of Paul Shaw, Mark Eldredge, and Len Pickens, three reputable builders. (R.
346-47, 372-75.) In fact, all three have served on the board of the Utah Home Builders
Association, with Mr. Shaw as past president and Mr. Pickens as current president. All three of
these men testify that cost-plus agreements are very common in the construction industry. The
trial court was also provided with the affidavits of nine individuals, all of whom had recently
purchased a home from ProMax on a cost-plus basis. (R. 330-353.)
Another error by the trial court involves the Court's determination that the parties had
stipulated that there were $140,000 of cost overruns. (R. 703-705.) However, ProMax agreed to
no such stipulation. (R. 662, 703-705.) The Court's ruling that there was such a stipulation
clearly influenced the Court's decision.
In sum, the trial court took Mr. Mattson's word over Mr. Bates' word and Mr.
Barraclough's testimony and determined the contract was to be for a set fee. In light of the fact
that ample evidence has been presented to establish that Mr. Mattson knowingly offered false
testimony concerning the failed sale of his home, offered incompetent testimony regarding the
value of his home, and falsely testified concerning the contract to have ProMax build the home,
this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and award ProMax the amount due under the
cost-plus agreement, plus attorneys' fees. Alternatively, this case should be remanded for the
purpose of taking additional evidence.
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VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

In its March 18, 1996 ruling, the Court set forth Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. These findings and conclusions are full of errors and inconsistencies which contradict the
testimony offered at trial. An examination of the Court's March 18 ruling, contrasted with the
trial testimony and evidence, clearly establishes that the Judge's ruling does not comport with the
evidence.
A.

The Court Misinterpreted the Cost Breakdown (Exhibit 21) for the
Mattson Home.

In its ruling, the Court stated that "notwithstanding the financing documents with the
bank specifying the price of $190,200 for the construction itself." (R. 774.) The cost of
construction itself was not $190,000. The construction cost breakdown for the Mattson home
(Exhibit 21 at trial) clearly shows that $29,000 of the $190,200 was to be for one-half of the lot.
Another $5,000 was for the construction loan costs. The Court's holding that the price for
construction only was $190,200 is therefore clearly an error. The Court certainly would have
been less likely to believe Mr. Mattson's testimony if the Court had realized Mr. Mattson was
claiming the home was to be built for approximately $156,000, which the Court clearly did not
comprehend.
B.

The Mattsons Did Not Ask for a Written Contract.

The Court also found "[t]hat all times Defendants sought but were refused by Bates a
written contract specifying the terms of the agreement, namely, whether it was a cost-plus or
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specified fixed cost contract." (R. 774-75.) At no time during the trial was any testimony
offered that the Mattsons requested a written contract.
Mr. Mattson's own testimony affirms that he never sought any written documentation
establishing his agreement with ProMax, as follows:
Q:

Did you ever seek any written documentation?

A:

This was good enough. I thought this was.

THE COURT:

No. The question is did you seek any?

THE WITNESS:

Oh, I'm sorry. No, I did not, other than this [referring to
the cost breakdown], no.

(R. 690.)
C.

The Court Misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's Testimony.

With respect to Mr. Barraclough, the only third party involved in the transaction between
the Mattsons and ProMax, the court stated that Mr. Barraclough testified that:
In his 18 years as a construction loan officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely
rare and he had only seen approximately six of them, and moreover, that he would
not have authorized an arbitrated price for construction.
(R. 775.)
The trial court's assessment of Mr. Barraclough's testimony is not only inaccurate, but
the trial court failed to give any credence to Mr. Barraclough's statement that: "What I do
remember is that the home was to be built on a cost-plus . . . "
(R. 476.)
Mr. Barraclough also testified that:
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We all knew from day one that there would probably be extras and that we had to
established, because of deadlines, a price, and if in fact those things would go
over, then it certainly would be the responsibility . . . of the individual... to cover
it
(R. 476-77.)
D.

The Value of the Home at Completion Was Far in Excess of
$390,000.

As discussed above, the only testimony or evidence offered supporting a value of
$390,000 was the testimony of Matt Mattson, who admitted he no experience in real estate and
did not even know the square footage of the home. When viewed in contrast to the mountain of
evidence that shows the home was worth drastically more than $390,000, the trial court's
determination that the value was $390,000 is clearly erroneous.
E.

Change Orders Do Not Need To Be Written.

The court stated that a factor was its decision was that "not one written change order was
obtained or produced at the trial." (R. 775.) There is no legal requirement that change orders be
written. Moreover, Mr. Mattson's own testimony is replete with examples of subsequent
changes. Furthermore, it was Mr. Mattson's understanding that many of the building materials to
be used in the home were to be decided at a later date, which would necessitate change orders.
(R. 694-96.)
F.

The Court's Ruling Regarding the Failed Sale of the Mattson
Home Was Clearly Erroneous.

The court stated that "Defendants were able to obtain an offer from a ready, willing, and
able buyer to purchase the home for $560,000." (R. 776.) This does not comport with the
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evidence. Exhibit 54, the Earnest Money Agreement, illustrates that the offer, which was never
accepted, was for $565,000. Moreover, Matt Mattson testified that the $565,000 offer was later
changed to $550,000. (R. 698-99.) No evidence was presented regarding the alleged $550,000
contract and the Court made no mention of it in the Court's findings.
G.

The Mattsons Never Accepted the Johnsens' Offer to Purchase
Their Home.

In its March 18 ruling, the Court found that "[o]n August 28th, 1993 . . . Defendants
accepted the offer." (R. 776.) There was no testimony or evidence presented at trial which
substantiates the Court's finding that the offer was accepted on August 28, 1993. Conversely,
the Earnest Money Agreement clearly illustrates that the offer was never accepted.
H.

Making a Demand for Payment Is Not a Pre-requisite to Filing a
Mechanic's Lien.

The court found that mechanic's liens were wrongfully filed against the Mattsons' home
because no demand for payment was made before filing the liens. However, Utah Ann. §38-1-1
et seq. contains no requirement that demand for payment be made before filing such liens. Thus,
the court's finding that Bates had materialmen wrongfully file liens because "he had suppliers
and/or materialmen file liens even though he knew no demands for payment had been made on
Defendant," was in error because there is no requirement that a materialman make a demand for
payment before filing a materialman's lien. (R. 776.)
Even if Phil Bates did have his subcontractors file liens, it is not improper for a contractor
to look after his subcontractors' best interests by advising them to file liens. Therefore, the
court's determination that filing the liens was wrongful was in error.
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L

The Sale of the Mattson Home Did Not Fail Because of the
Mechanic's Liens.

The court found that "[t]he potential buyer, when apprised of the liens, backed out of the
transaction." (R. 776.) As established in the affidavits of Curtis Johnsen, Nancy Johnsen, Marty
Gale, Laurie Gale, and Greg Fabiano, the sale did not fail due to mechanic's liens. The sale, in
fact, failed because the Mattsons informed the Johnsens that they no longer desired to sell the
home.
J.

The Court Miscalculated the Cost Overruns.

In its March 18 ruling, the court stated that "Defendants paid approximately $170,000
more than called for . . . " (R. 778.) However, the testimony of Mr. Mattson was that the
overruns were $140,000. (R. 706.) Appellant noted the discrepancy to the court, which amended
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect that the alleged overruns were only
$140,000. Nevertheless, the Court's initial finding of $170,000 is futher evidence of the Court's
lack of understanding in this case.
K.

The Court Misconstrued Culley Davis' Testimony.

The Court found that "[t]he owner of the Plaintiffs corporation acknowledged in his
deposition that he was unaware that the basic price was about $195,000, while at trial he insisted
that the contract was cost-plus." (R. 778.) This misconstrues Mr. Davis' testimony.
Mr. Davis did testify in his deposition that they would build the Mattsons' "home, plus
$10,000 or $12,000" (R. 92 at 22.) Mr. Davis attempted to clarify his statements regarding the
so-called basic price during his deposition, but was refused the opportunity by opposing counsel.
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(R. 92 at 41-42.) Mr. Davis did, however, clarify this statement to the Court at trial. (R. 751,
753, 756-57.) In spite of all of Mr. Davis' clarification, the Court focused on an ambiguous
statement, which was later clarified during the deposition and at trial, and still held that Mr.
Davis' testimony was "too inconsistent and contradictory to be persuasive." The Court's holding
was improper.
L.

The Court Improperly Ruled That The Parties Stipulated That
There Were Cost Overruns.

The Court improperly ruled that the parties stipulated that $140,000 in cost overruns
existed (R. 703-05.) ProMax never agreed to any such stipulation. (R. 703-05.)

IX.

RULE 59faV UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. ALLOWS THE
TRIAL COURT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

The trial court denied ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial on the basis that ProMax's
motion was allegedly untimely. However, a motion for new trial, partial new trial, etc. is proper
until "10 days after the entry of the judgment." (Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.)
ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial was well within this time frame.
The trial court ruled that ProMax's Motion for Partial New Trial was properly dismissed
because all relevant evidence should have allegedly been submitted at trial. It is debatable,
however, whether Mr. Mattson's false testimony could have or should have been discovered by
plaintiff. The Court felt that ProMax should have discovered Mr. Mattson was lying prior to or
during trial. However, ProMax was not involved with the transaction regarding the failed sale of

-39-

the home and although ProMax requested documents such as the Earnest Money Agreement, it
was never presented with the document until being surprised with it during trial.
Furthermore, Rule 59(a) provides several grounds for partial new trial that do not involve
new evidence. This Court should reverse the trial court's judgment or require the trial court to
take additional evidence as requested by ProMax in accordance with Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which
either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict,
or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by
resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit or any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision or that it is against law.
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(7) Error in law.
(Emphasis added.)
Subsection (1) provides that a new trial may be granted "[i]f irregularity in the
proceedings" exists. Fraudulent testimony upon which the court bases its decision is certainly an
irregularity in the proceedings and reopening the case is appropriate in such a case. See Albin v.
Illinois, 277 111. App. 3d 50, 660 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (1995) (false testimony by a material witness
may alone be sufficient to warrant a new trial where the perjured testimony permeates the
judicial process); In re Marriage of Clark, 813 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. 1991) ("Granting a new
trial on the ground of perjury rests within the discretion of the trial court"); Matter of Cook, 527
A.2d 1115, 1116 (Pa. 1987) ("when the trial court concludes that a perjury has been committed,
it is within the court's discretion to grant a new trial").
Subsection (3) provides that a new trial is appropriate in the case of "[a]ccident or
surprise .. ." Exhibit 54, the Earnest Money Agreement upon which the Court relied in awarding
damages to defendants, is within the ambit of subsection (3) because it was not presented to
plaintiff prior to trial even though such a document should have been produced in accordance
with ProMax's discovery requests and was objected to by plaintiff when introduced by the
Mattsons as an exhibit at trial.
Whether or not ordinary prudence should have required plaintiffs prior counsel to
discover that Mr. Mattson offered false testimony is debatable; particularly when the amount
plaintiff was seeking was approximately $15,000 and the counterclaim filed by defendants was
202 paragraphs long containing 12 causes of action. Investigating ever) possible fact and
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witness with such a counterclaim was viewed as prohibitively expensive by plaintiffs prior
counsel.
Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony related to the Mattsons' dealings with the potential
buyers of the home. ProMax was not involved in those dealings. Therefore it would be unfair to
insist that Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony relating to the failed sale of the home should have
been exposed prior to or during the trial. This same argument applies to subsection (4) which
allows a new trial for newly-discovered evidence. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial New Trial
should not have been barred merely because plaintiffs prior counsel did not discover earlier that
Mr. Mattson was not being truthful with the court.
Subsection (5) permits a new trial if the damages awarded are "[e]xcessive or
inadequate . . . " In addition to exposing Mr. Mattson's fraudulent testimony, ProMax also
directed the court's attention to evidence establishing that the damages awarded were excessive.
ProMax's motion is also appropriate under subsection (6), which allows a new trial if the
evidence is not sufficient to justify a verdict. Plaintiff has made such a contention in this case.
Subsection (7) provides that a new trial is appropriate if there as an error in law. The trial
court has been informed that the Earnest Money Agreement, upon which the trial court based its
award of damages, violates the statute of frauds.
ProMax's request for the trial court to take additional evidence was appropriate not only
under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but also under Rule 60(b), which provides in
relevant part as follows:
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(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party:... (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

(Emphasis added.)
The trial court refused to take additional evidence on the basis that it was allegedly
untimely under Rule 59. However, setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) on the basis of
fraud or misrepresentation requires only that the motion be made within three months after the
judgment. The judgment in this case should have been set aside.
The testimony of five individuals with no stake in this litigation resoundingly established
that Mr. Mattson falsely testified before the trial court with respect to the failed sale of his home.
Such conduct certainly falls within the parameters of Rule 59 and Rule 60(b). ProMax therefore
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's judgment or require the trial court to
take additional evidence.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence presented herein, and particularly in light of the fact that the
offer to purchase the Mattson home was never accepted, ProMax requests this Court to reverse
the trial court's award of $170,000 for alleged tortious interference with the sale of the Mattson
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home and ProMax also requests that this Court reverse the award of $23,000 for defects based
upon the Court's ruling that the contract to build the home was for a set fee. ProMax, therefore,
is entitled to recover in the amount of $14,533.22, plus attorneys' fees which shall be awarded
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, the mechanic's lien statute.
Alternatively, ProMax requests that the case be remanded so that the trial court may take
additional evidence to clarify the court's numerous misunderstandings and findings that are
inconsistent with the record.
DATED this 3 ^ day of September, 1996.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rex E/Madsen
KoreyiiX Rasmussen
David L. Pinkston
Attorneys for Plaintiff
N\19057\1\APPEALBRF
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ADDENDUM

FORESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL

25-1-1

(3) Monies in the account shall be used as provided m
Section 23-26-4.
(4) The Wildlife Board shall report to the 1994 Legislature
on funds received and programs developed.
*" 3

TITLE 24
FORESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL
(Repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 53, § 21; 1973, ch. 36, § 1;
1988, ch. 121, § 18.)

TITLE 25
FRAUD
Chapter
1. Fraudulent Conveyances [Repealed].
2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed].
3. Leases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed].
4. Marketing Wool [Repealed].
5. Statute of Frauds.
6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
CHAPTER 1
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED]
25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed.

iW

CHAPTER 2
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED]
25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed.

l**5

CHAPTER 3
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK [REPEALED]
25-3-1 to 25-3-4. Repealed.

i#*

CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED]
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.

i#*

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third person.
Promise to answer for obligation of another ~~
When not required to be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases f° r
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over o r
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed o r

V$k

conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, gr*m
ing, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by hi
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
it*
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power o;
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will anc
testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or be^%
extinguished by implication or operation of law.
me
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, sfaall
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
X9&
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written £**d
signed.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be
nerfotmad within erne ysar from. the. making Q€ the. ^sgCRft?
ment;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, defaultt o r
miscarriage of another;
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises
to marry;
(4) every special promise made by an executor or a<**
ministrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, 0** *°
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his o*m
estate;
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an a# e n t
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation»
(6) every credit agreement.
(a) As used in Subsection (6):
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by
a financial institution to lend, delay, or other^ 1 ^
modify an obligation to repay money, goodSf o r
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, of *°
make any other financial accommodate011"Credit agreement" does not include the u£ ua *
and customary agreements related to dep***1*
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associate"
with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institufl on
which extends credit or extends a financial ac "
commodation under a credit agreement wit*1 a
debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seek* o r
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a finan^1
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a
financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means a stat£ o r
federally chartered bank, savings and loan a*80*
ciation, savings bank, industrial loan corp^J3"
tion, credit union, or any other institution vXP?*
the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Finaxx^j
Institutions as provided in Title 7, F i n a u ^
Institutions Act.
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(e)'
debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action oQ
credit agreement unless the agreement is in ^**JJ~!
expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant te^r
and conditions, and is signed by the party ^ZByZ
whom enforcement of the agreement would ,
sought. For purposes of this act, a signed applies*10

LIBRARIES

36-22-3

(c) review the operations of the Division of Indian
Affairs and other state agencies working with Utah Native American tribes;
(d) help sponsor meetings and other opportunities for
discussion with and between Native Americans.
(2) In conducting its business, the committee shall comply
with the rules of legislative interim committees.
1996
36-22-3. Staff support.
The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
shall provide staff support to the committee.
1995

TITLE 37
LIBRARIES
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, §§ 257,
258, 260 to 304.)
Chapter
1. State Law Library [Renumbered].
2. City Libraries [Renumbered].
3. County Public Libraries [Renumbered].
4. State Library [Renumbered].
5. Depository Libraries [Renumbered].
CHAPTER 1
STATE LAW LIBRARY
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241,
§§ 272 to 283.)
37-1-1 to 37-1-12. Renumbered as §§ 9-7-301 to 9-7-312.
CHAPTER 2

TITLE 38
LIENS
Chapter
1. Mechanics' Liens.
2. Miscellaneous Liens.
3. Lessors' Liens.
4. Common Carriers' Liens.
5. Judgment Lien — United States Courts.
6. Federal Tax Liens.
7. Hospital Lien Law.
8. Self-Service Storage Facilities.
9. Penalty for Wrongful Lien.
10. Oil, Gas, and Mining Liens.
11. Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
12. Notice of Lien Filing.
CHAPTER 1
MECHANICS' LIENS
Section
38-1-1.
38-1-2.
38-1-3.
38-1-4.
38-1-5.
38-1-6.
38-1-7.
38-1-8.

CITY LIBRARIES

38-1-9.
38-1-10.

(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241,
§§ 284 to 293.)

38-1-11.

37-2-1 to 37-2-10. Renumbered as §§ 9-7-401 to 9-7-410.
CHAPTER 3
COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARIES
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241,
§§ 294 to 304.)
37-3-1 to 37-3-11. Renumbered as §§ 9-7-501 to 9-7-511.
CHAPTER 4

38-1-12.
38-1-13.
38-1-14.
38-1-15.
38-1-16.
38-1-17.
38-1-18.
38-1-19.
38-1-20.

STATE LIBRARY

38-1-21.

(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, §§ 258, 261 to 263,
268, 269, 271.)

38-1-22.

37-4-1 to 37-4-10. Renumbered as 55 9-7-201, 9-7-204 to
9-7-206, 9-7-211, 9-7-212, 9-7-214.
CHAPTER 5
DEPOSITORY LIBRARIES
(Renumbered by Laws 1992, ch. 241, 55 257, 260, 264 to
267, 270.)
37-5-1 to 37-5-8. Renumbered as 55 9-7-101, 9-7-203,
9-7-207 to 9-7-210, 9-7-213.
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38-1-23.
38-1-24.
38-1-25.
38-1-26.
38-1-27.

Public buildings not subject to act.
"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined.
Those entitled to lien — What may be attached.
Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions
— Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances.
Priority — Over other encumbrances.
Priority over claims of creditors of original contractor or subcontractor.
Notice of claim — Contents — Recording —
Service on owner of property.
Liens on several separate properties in one
claim.
Notice imparted by record.
Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing
regardless of time of filing.
Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action for debt not affected.
Repealed.
Parties — Joinder — Intervention.
Decree — Order of satisfaction.
Sale — Redemption — Disposition of proceeds.
Deficiency judgment.
Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attorneys'
fee to subcontractor.
Attorneys' fees.
Payment by owner to contractor — Subcontractor's lien not affected.
When contract price not payable in cash —
Notice.
Advance payments — Effect on subcontractor's
lien.
Advance payments under terms of contract —
Effect on liens.
Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, except for purchase price.
Cancellation of record — Penalty.
Abuse of lien right — Penalty.
Assignment of lien.
Preliminary notice to original contractor — Form
and contents — Service — Notice of commencement of project or improvement.

38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act.
^
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any publfc^
IBSSl
building, structure or improvement.
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LIENS

38-1"

pitspefty, OT some pati di t n e property, is situated, a wi**
notice to hold and claim a hen within 90 days from the 0\„
(a) the person last performed labor or service of *
furnished equipment or material on a project or imp*' V
ment for a residence as denned in Section 38-11-10^'
(b) of final completion of an original contract n0^
volving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth, n
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, v
known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was empr
or to whom he furnished the equipment or matenah w „
(c) the tame when the first and last labor or service W g
performed or the first and last equipment or materia)
furnished,
t ,
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for ide^
cation, and
(e) the signature of the hen claimant or his a u t h o ^ e
agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as requ x
under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents t l c
acknowledgment or certificate is required for any n^
filed after April 29, 1985, and before Apnl 24, 1989 <le
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of hen, the t ^
claimant shall deliver or mail by certified mail to eithe^ v 0
reputed owner or record owner of the real property a cofno
the notice of hen If the record owner's current address i^ +u

$8-1-2. ^Contractors* a n d * subcontractors* aenne<^ c t
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by cont^^I
express or imphed, with the owner, as in this chapter j h e r
vided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and all ^ e d
persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be dee^j^
subcontractors
^^
^ed.
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attacJ^y
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing e n t
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipr^™,
used m the construction, alteration, or improvement of - n y
building or structure or improvement to any premises in ^ g
manner and licensed architects and engineers and arti^ n s
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specificatr 011
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendent' ^
who have rendered other like professional service, or besto m g
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concer^j..
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or j^e
mshed or rented materials or equipment for the value of ^ n t
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipi^^g
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at ^ s
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by\. e n
authonty as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as the ^ e n
is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence K ^
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act This hen shall a t ^
only to such interest as the owner may have in the p r o p e ^ ^
ifvi38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and sub**^.
sions — Franchises, fixtures, and app**
nances.
ver
The hens granted by this chapter shall extend to and c° o r
so much of the land whereon such building, structuring,
improvement shall be made as may be necessary for c^^ng
nient use and occupation of the land In case any such bu^^l^
shall occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of * ^Q
such lots or subdivisions shall be considered as one fo*" ter
purposes of this chapter The hens provided for m this c b ^ ^ ^
shall attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances^ e c to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used in co**^ve_
taon with any such lands, buildings, structures, or i m p ^ 9 8 7
ments

last-known address of the record owner, using the nam^ 5 m
addresses appearing on the last completed real p r ^ y lc
assessment rolls of the county where the affected prop^^ t ^ e
located Failure to deliver or mail the notice of hen t° a n t
reputed owner or record owner precludes the hen cla****teG
from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reP 1 9 9 5
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the hen
one
38-1-8. L i e n s o n several s e p a r a t e properties ii*
claim.
L#nts
Liens against two or more buildings or other improve*** j 3 U t
owned by the same person may be included m one clan**' t k e
in such case the person filing the claim must designate $ o r
amount claimed to be due to him on each of such buildif*^ 9g7
other improvements

38-1-5. P r i o r i t y — Over o t h e r e n c u m b r a n c e s .
j^e
The hens herein provided for shall relate back to, and r, o r
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do wof^ ve _
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or i m p ^ L e r
ment, and shall have priority over any hen, mortgage or ° fae
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently XP m_
tune when the building, improvement or structure was c ^ue
menced, work begun, or first material furnished oi* 0 f
ground, also over any hen, mortgage or other encumbral*c i e ( j
which the hen holder had no notice and which was u n r e e l

38-1-9. N o t i c e imparted b y r e c o r d .
a ^
(1) The recorder must record the claim m an index &
tamed for that purpose
on3
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all ve \wi
are considered to have notice of the claim
diial
38-1-10. Laborers' a n d m a t e r i a l m e n ' s l i e n o n #H
f o o t i n g regardless o f t i m e o f
filing.
J as
The hens for work and labor done or material furnishings
provided in this chapter shall be upon an equal icO ^ ^

commenced, work begun, or first material furnished o&
ground

M

^38-1-6. P r i o r i t y o v e r c l a i m s o f c r e d i t o r s of o r * ^ ^
»L
contractor or subcontractor.
tt0n
&No attachment, garnishment or levy under an e x ^ J r n e r
frpon any money due to an original contractor from the ° A\i^
m any property subject to hen under this chapter shall b^ v* n o
tto against any hen of a subcontractor or materialman, &
^
guch attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money ^ D e
f* subcontractor or materialman from the contractor s b ^ \ o r
galid as against any hen of a laborer employed by the ^\9^
88-1-7. N o t i c e o f c l a i m — C o n t e n t s — Recordi* 1 ^
S e r v i c e o n o w n e r of property.
. ^je
M l ) A person claiming benefits under this chapter sh^J* ^
fftt record with the county recorder of the county in whi^*1

regardless of the time of performing such work and W* ^953
furnishing such material
E n f o r c e m e n t — T i m e f o r — L i s p e n dei&
^
A c t i o n for debt n o t affected.
yen
(1) A hen claimant shall file an action to enforce t&
filed under this chapter within
9 0O\ of
t
(a) twelve months from the date of final comply £jj e ( |
the original contract not involving a residence as d*
in Section 38-11-102, or
j^st
(b) 180 days from the date the hen daimaH* n t
performed labor and services or last furnished GQ^Sg^iior material for a residence, as defined in Section *
102.
Lzb*fc(2) (a) Within the tune period provided for filing in S u t n e
tion (1) the hen claimant shall file for record w i ^ w
county recorder of each county in which the I1
38-1-11.
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recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the
manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to
possession of real property, or t h e lien shall be void, except
as to persons who have been m a d e parties to t h e action
and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action.
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon t h e lien claimant
and those claiming under him to show actual knowledge.
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect
the right of any person to whom a debt may be due for any
Work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal
action to recover the same.
1995
38-1-12. R e p e a l e d .

1981

38-1-13. Parties — Joinder — Intervention.
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may join as
plaintiffs, and when separate actions are commenced the court
may consolidate them and make all persons having claims
filed parties to the action. Those claiming liens who fail or
refuse to become parties plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and any one not made a party may at any time before the
final hearing intervene.
1953
38-1-14. Decree — Order of satisfaction.
la every case la which 2ieas are claimed against the same
property the decree shall provide for their satisfaction in the
following order:
(1) Subcontractors who are laborers or mechanics
working by the day or piece, but without furnishing
materials therefor;
(2) All other subcontractors and all materialmen;
(3) The original contractors.
1953
58-1-15. Sale — Redemption — Disposition of proceeds.
The court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction
Qf the liens and costs as in the case of foreclosure of mortgages,
Subject to the same right of redemption. If the proceeds of sale
^fter the payment of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the
Vhole amount of liens included in the decree, then such
proceeds shall be paid in the order above designated, and pro
*ata to the persons claiming in each class where the sum
Realized is insufficient to pay the persons of such class in full.
Any excess shall be paid to the owner.
1953
§8-1-16. Deficiency j u d g m e n t .
Every person whose claim is not satisfied as herein provided
*hay have judgment docketed for t h e balance unpaid, and
Execution therefor against the party personally liable.
1953
58-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs a n d attorneys' fee to subcontractor.
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, as between the
Owner and the contractor the court shall apportion the costs
According to the right of the case, but in all cases each
Subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to
*tim, including the costs of preparing and recording the notice
Of claim of lien and such reasonable attorneys' fee as may be
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of claim of
lien.
1996
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful
Party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to
te fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
Action.
1995
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor — Subcontractor's lien not affected.
' When any subcontractor shall have actually begun to furbish labor or materials for which he is entitled to a lien no
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payment to the original contractor shall impair or defeat such
lien; and no alteration of any contract shall affect any Uen
acquired under the provisions of this chapter.
1953
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in cash —
Notice.
As to all liens, except that of the contractor, the whole
contract price shall be payable in money, except as herein
provided, and shall not be diminished by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or counterclaim in favor of the
owner and against the contractor, except when the owner has
contracted to pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the
owner shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a
statement of the terms and conditions of the contract before
materials are furnished or labor is performed, which notice
must be kept posted, and when so posted shall give notice to
all parties interested of the terms and conditions of the
contract. Any person willfully tearing down or defacing such
notice is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953
38-1-21. Advance payments — Effect on subcontractor's lien.
No payment made prior to the time when the same is due
under the terms and conditions of the contract shall be valid
for the purpose of defeating, diminishing or discharging any
lien in favor of any person except the contractor; but as to any
such lien such payment shall be deemed as if not made,
notwithstanding that the contractor to whom it was paid may
thereafter abandon his contract or be or become indebted to
the owner for damages for nonperformance of his contract or
otherwise.
1953
38-1-22. Advance payments u n d e r terms of contract —
Effect on liens.
The subcontractors' liens provided for in this chapter shall
extend to the full contract price, but if at the time of the
commencement to do work or furnish materials the owner has
paid upon the contract, in accordance with the terms thereof,
any portion of the contract price, either in money or property,
the lien of the contractor shall extend only to such unpaid
balance, and the lien of any subcontractor who has notice of
such payment shall be limited to the unpaid balance of the
contract price. No part of the contract price shall by the terms
of any contract be made payable, nor shall the same or any
part thereof be paid in advance of the commencement of the
work, for the purpose of evading or defeating the provisions of
this chapter.
1953
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials furnished,
except for purchase price.
Whenever materials have been furnished for use in the
construction, alteration or repair of any building, work or
other improvement mentioned in Section 38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject to attachment, execution or other legal
process to enforce any debt due by the purchaser of such
materials, other than a debt due for the purchase money
thereof, so long as in good faith the same are about to be
applied to the construction, alteration or repair of such building or improvement.
1953
38-1-24. Cancellation of record — Penalty.
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein, on the
payment of the amount thereof together with the costs incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall at the request of any
person interested in the property charged therewith cause
Said lien to be canceled of record within ten days from the
request, and upon failure to so cancel his lien within the time
aforesaid shall forfeit and pay to the person making the
request the sum of $20 per day until the same shall be
tanceled, to be recovered in the same manner as other debts-
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388-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty.
>Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for reco^,
•claim of lien against any property, which contains a gr^^,
tdemand than the sum due him, with the intent to clouc^ .,
title, or to exact from the owner or person liable by m e a ^ ®
'such excessive claim of lien more than is due him, Q^
"procure any advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty Q*
misdemeanor.
^
38-1-26. Assignment of lien.
s All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as QM
choses in action, and the assignee may commence and £^ e r
.ecute actions thereon in his own name in the manner h ^ ( ossin
•provided.
*953

88-1-27. Preliminary notice to original contractor _
Form and contents — Service — Notic^ commencement of project or improveme*^
(1) This section relating to preliminary notices does *
apply to residential construction or to work performed in J °
•construction. For the purposes of this section, residen^ ,
construction means single family detached housing and m> .
tifamily attached housing up to and including fourplexes, ^ "
includes rental housing.
(2) Except subcontractors who are in privity of contr*
with an original contractor or except for persons performs
labor for wages, any person claiming, reserving the right f
.claim, or intending to claim a mechanic's lien under t l .
'chapter for labor, service, equipment, or material shall prov} ,
preliminary notice to the original contractor as prescribed \
this section. Any person who fails to provide this prelimin^ ^
^otice has no right to claim a mechanic's lien under tjkV
Vs
chapter.
(3) The preliminary notice required by this section shall *
-i.i
:
J
: - ~ the
± u ~ course v&
jn writing
andi may ibe given
ati. any *.:
time during
Of
the project or improvement.
(4) A person required by this section to give prelimin^
.notice is only required to give one notice for each project ^
improvement, which may include an entire structure o^ o r
a
scheme of improvements.
^(5) If the labor, service, equipment, or material is furnish ,
pursuant to contracts with more than one subcontractor
jrith more than one original contractor, the notice requi^ or
ments must be met with respect to the labor, service, equ^e"
ment, or materials furnished to each such subcontractor **~
. (6) The person required by this section to give preliminai
notice is precluded from making a claim for any labor, servic"^
equipment, or material which was provided more than 45 da] e '
prior to the date the preliminary notice is given. The prelin/.8
nary notice must be given before a notice of lien is filed wit!*
the county recorder pursuant to Section 38-1-7.
(7) The preliminary notice under this section shall includ
(a) the name, address, and telephone number of tr 6,
person furnishing the labor, service, equipment, or mat<ie
s
rial;
"
(b) the name and address of the person who contracte ,
for the furnishing of the labor, service, equipment, c
)r
material; and
(c) the address of the project or improvement or
drawing sufficient to describe the location of the project c a
>r
improvement.
(8) (a) Service of a preliminary notice is sufficient if th
notice is deposited in the United States mail, certified cie
registered, return receipt requested, postage prepaii r
Service of the preliminary notice by mail is complete upo
n
deposit of the certified or registered mail.
•
'M A nroliminarv notice served by mail may be ac.

k
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or his address as shown on the notice of commence
^ent
on record with the county recorder as required by Suk
$ection (10).
(9) The applicability of this section, including the waiw
rights or privileges granted or protected by this section, J|"
not be varied by agreement.
^
(10) Any right to assert a defense of failure to comply w. ,
1
the preliminary notice requirements of this section is 7 r?
unless the original contractor records a notice of comnw
ment of the project or improvement with the county reco??6"
for the county or counties where the project is located w u ? e r
30 days after commencement of the project. The noti^ *!
commencement shall include the following:
(a) the name and address of the owner of the proj^ f
or
improvement;
(b) the name and address of the original contract^
(c) the name and address of the surety providing '
payment bond for the project or improvement, or if ^ y
exists, a statement that a payment bond was not req\K ne ,
for the work being performed;
(d) the name and address of the project; and
(e) a legal description of the property on which .,
project is located.
*991
CHAPTER 2
MISCELLANEOUS LIENS
Section
38-2-1.
38-2-2.
38-2-3.
38-2-3.1.
38-2-3.2.
38-2-4.
38-2-5.

Lien on livestock — For feed and care.
Liens of hotels and boardinghouse keepers
Repairman's lien on personal property —
'*en
subject to rights of secured parties.
Special lien on personal property for servi
rendered — General lien of dry cleaning esK f
lishments, laundries, and shoe repair shop*
Sale of unclaimed personal property.
Disposal of property by lienholder — Procedu
Action for deficiency.

38-2-1. Lien on livestock — For feed and care.
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, tew^
keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any domestic aninv,
shall be entrusted for the purpose of feeding, herding
pasturing shall have a lien upon such animals for the amowthat may he due him for such feeding, herding orpasturix
and is authorized to retain possession of such animals un^t
such amount is paid.
*•«s
38-2-2. Liens of hotels and boardinghouse keepers.
Every innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse
^
lodginghouse keeper shall have a lien on the baggage a j j
other property in and about such inn belonging t o - . ^ ^ T e r
control of his guests or boarders for the proper chargesJK^
him for their accommodation, board and lodging, fofJB?*J?jfr
paid for or advanced to them, and for such other ?f???? * f § i
furnished at their request. The innkeeper, Hotel keeper^Djw^
inghouse or lodginghouse keeper may detain
*^jf@£!&
and other property until the amount of such charge ttpal^
and the baggage and other property shall ^ ^ ? ? S 5 $ ^ "
attachment or execution until the Hotel or : boarding
keeper's lien and the costs of enforcing it J ^ K j S f e p ^ S

38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal V™gjffi<subject to rights ot secured P**1*£*;
Every person who shall make,
^j^JSg^f
labor upon, any article of personal P r ^ P ^ § ^ S K
the owner or other person entitled to ~*~~
have a lien upon such article for t n e ^ ~ - - ,
-ji.i™ ~^nm*A flI1d materials furnisbedan*"?*

^ ^

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

with the clerk of the district court in any other county where
the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar
entry in the judgment docket shall be made by the clerk of
such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as in the
county where the same was originally entered.
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relieve a party or his legal representative from a final ju<u
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: Qi
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect* vr\
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could' not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. Amotion under this Subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.

Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment::
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any
general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct
may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party Rule 61. Harmless error.
making the application, which he could not, with reasonNo error in either the admission or the exclusion of eviable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties,
have been given under the influence of passion or preju- is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
dice.
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
other decision, or that it is against law.
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
(7) Error in law.
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be rights of the parties.
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other
hew trial is made under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the upon the entry of the judgment, unless the court in its
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution
of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed
verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendgrounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to ment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant
ulter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 to Rule 52(b).
(c) Injunction pending appeal* When an appeal is taken
days after entry of the judgment.
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving,
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it consider*
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay,
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or the**
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing tb«
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedes*
with leave of the appellate court
bond is approved by the court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of Utah, &
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any department

CONSTRUCTION COST BREAKDOWN-LOT 641
ADDRESS: 6642 So. Stone Mill Drive
BUYER: Matt Mactson
Bank
Desc

Description

1 1 (Plans

1 (Engineering
2 Permits
[Insurance
6 |Temp Power
6 Temp Heat
38 Water Connection
38 Sewer Connection
5 Stake Lot
7 Dig Hole
17 Steel Footing/Found
9 Footing Labor
8 Footing Cement
9 Foundation Labor
8 Foundation Cement
9 Pumping Concrete
WicdowWells
18 | Tar & Termite
19) Back Fill
19 | Fill Garage/Basement
7 ) Dirt HauJin* In/Out
251 Bsmt Cement Labor
2 5 Basement Cement
25 JGarage Cement Lab
25 (Garage Cemnet
20 | Yard Lines SWP
1
104 (Cut Approach
1
27 (FramingLabor
1
26 ! Framing Material
'
30 (Windows
j
30 iBaseroentWindows
35 (ExteriorDoors
|
96 ^Special Tub
36 [Roofing
j
49 (Fireplace Unit
j
43 j Heating
48 (Air Conditioning
20 (Plumbing
j
47 JElecTV, Phone
|
101 (Vacuum
1
4? : Alarm
1
50 i Brick or Stone
j
57 {Insulation
1
85 lExtFlatworkLabor" {
85 1 Ext Flatwork Cement |
65 iGtnzcDooc
|
59 1Sheerrock
1

[
[

1^

j

I

(
|
I

j

|

Previous
Disbursed

Budget

Sub Contractor

'

1800.00"1
650.00 1
1150.00
200.00
250.00 L
280.00 1
1250.00
200.00 '
1000.00
1400.00
1350.00
2000.00
2500.00
3000.00'
900.00)
i

200.00 1
750.00
250.00 1

I
!
i
j
1

1600.00 I
2000.00]
400.00 '
700.00 |
1000.00]
400.00 1
12000.00 j
25000.00 '
5CC0.C0 i
1

1

!

!

IOOO.OO i

1
!
!
1
|
I
I

1500.00 1
1200.00!
3000.00 1
2200.00 |
6000.00 j
65CO.0O !
6CO.0O (

1
I
j
1
|
)

|
2500.CO.1
25CO.CO )
25CO.00 ,f
25CO.00 |
1200.00/
12000 00 1

2139.00
650.00
1844.28
0.00
71-40
0.00
0.00
1250.00
200.00
1035.00
1348.07
1218.75
2000.00
4551.25
3000.00
1391.88
0.00
19240
185950
469.00
0.00
123134
2000.00
0.00
0.00
729.00
0.00|
16500.00 r
35608.09
7935.47,1
0.00 i
0.00 1
4475.25 I
387209 !
1257.37 !
7660.00 1
0.00 1
752200]
0.00 I
1198.19 1
0.00 1
0.00 j
30CO.00

Current
Draw

Total
Disbursed

1
j

j
1"
[

|
!
I
1

2139.00"
650.00
1844.28
0.00
71.40|
0.00 1
0.00 1
1250.00
200.00
1035.00
1348.07 I
1218.75
2000.00 |
4551.25
3000.00
1391.88 1
0.00 !
19240
1859.50
469.00

0.00 I

537.34 |
0.00 )

j
1
|

123234
2000.00
0.00 1
0.00
729.00 1
0.00 j
16800.00 1
35608.09 I
7935.47 j
0.00 i
0.00!
4475.25 !
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7660.00 *
0.00 i
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0.00 i
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0.00 1
0.00 j
3000.00 i
0.00 I
53734i_
000 i

nooo.oo I

i

ucoo.ooJ.

o.oo i

1

i
|
i
!
!
]

I'nd

'

aw
-93

Draw
6-05-93

Draw
6-20-93

Draw
7-06-93

Draw
7-0S-93
1

9.00 |
0.00 j
4.28
[

Draw

Draw

Draw

Draw

i

1

55.31

Draw
7-20-93

Total
Draw*

|
I
|_

16.09

[
j

0.00 1

|
|

1250.00
200.00
1035.00
1348.07
1218.75
2000.00 1
4551.25 1
3000.00 j

I

1391.88

200.00
24124
| 1218.75

480.62
I
1 3000.00
900.00
1.5*

9.38

4551.25

19240
1859.50
469.00

|

1
1232.34
2000.00

i

119&19

1198.19J

i

i

729.00

1
20553.84
7935.47

i

1
4475.25
387109
1257.37
7660.00
2192.00

i
i
!
i

1

1800.00

201138

0.00

5330.00

|
1

i

13C41.87

0.00
19140
1859.50
469.00
123134
2000.00
0.00]
0.00 1
729.00 1
0.00 I
16800.00 |
35608.09
7935,47
#00
0.00
4475.25
387109
1257.37
7660.00
0.00
752100

1

11 .5000.00 1 7000.00

apo

1
0.00
5.00
5.83

2139.00 |
650.00
1S44.28
0.00 1
71.40 '

I

0.00 J
0.001
0.00J
3000.00
I

|

i

1

537.34

1

I

j
|

11000.00

3000.00J
0.00 |
537.34

aooj
lioooooj
0.00

aooj

CONSTRUCTION COST BREAKDOWN-LOT 641
ADDRESS: 6642 So. Stone Mil! Drive
BUYER: Matt Mattson
Bank
Desc.
i

r

Description

49 [Mantel
Finish Labor
54 Finish Material
76 Railing
78 Paint
102 Plaster Foundation
89 {Flooring
79 Cabinet
SO Countertops
loo Appliances
41 Fin Elec Allowance
101 Fin Hardware Labor
101 |Fin Hardware Mat
76 (Outside Railing
104 |Decks
88 1M i rro r/S h o we r Doo rs
110 i Q e a n up Inside
110 j O e a n up Outside
105 ! Final Grading
103 iGutierine

~T^'

;
1
!
!
[

;
i
|
!
1
1

Sub Contractor

Previous
Disbursed

Budget

1
!
»

j

1
1

~

noo

0

2200.00 i
0.00 i

22CO.00

-1200

0.00

25C0

i
4000.00 j
250.00 I
6000.00 1
4000.00!

o.co:

0.00

0.

0.00 j

O.CO

4000.

o.co!
0.00 1

0.00
0.00

250.
6T<V.
4r'X>

1
1800.CO [

1
350.00 i
800.00 i
i
i

j
»

i

870.00 *

4CO/0
~><Y\ff\

106 'Landscaping
106 (Fencing
iConst. Posing Costs
67 I Const. Loan Cost
4 .'Lot Cost
r

.'Sales Commission

1

|

5000.00
29CO0.CO
1

1 Discount Points

;
I

•

(FHAVAFees

;

'Extras

|

j Builders Fee

i
iPool

|

r

_

0.00
0.00

0

0.00 1
0.00 1
0.00 1

0.00

1300.

o.oo i

0.00 1

SCO.

O.CO i

f». 00 I

0

o.co '•
o.co;

0.0C' ;

r.

0.00 1

8~0.

o.co i

3C"\

3K'.00 !

310.00 i

O.CO !

O.CO j

O.CO

0.CO I
7

1117.50

H I 50!

0.00

O.CO !

O.CO '

o.co :•

O.CO ;
0.00

u.w i
0.00 !
0.00!

o.co:

o.
•W

fr/.p.

0.00 1

1

0.00 j

('•

l

O.CO i

i

o.oo |

c

j

0.0O!

1
1

1

!

O.Ou |

i

t
!

j

11500.00 i

O.OO !
9064.15 !

i

1

0.00' i

f
!
i__
!
1

0.00?
0.00;
O.CO i
0.00^
9064.15 !
0.<Y> !

o.co'

|

;

I

i

0.00-

;

t

i

|

j

•

0.00!

j
i

I

I

! TOTALS

0.
350.

j
!

o.oo
0.00|

O.CO j

i

f-

o.oo!
0.00 j

i

{•

1
i

0.00 1

0.00

swlv
3CO.(.0 i

310 IMisc Costs

UndisKur*-

10CO.00 j
2500.00 j

i

j

Total
Disbursed

Current
Draw

$190.2CO.CO

o.oc- :

000.
0.00 :

0.00 :

o.OO

$140,739.32 I

$0.00 ! $Hf». 739.32

f!

•')
0
J.i

2-3>
ii

(.
r,
0
$4y.-i^

Draw
-05-93

Draw
6-20-93

Draw
7-06-93

Draw
7-05-93

Draw

Draw
7-20-93

T

Draw

Draw

Draw

Total
Draws
0.00
2200.00

i

2200.00 '

0.00
O.OJ

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 1
U.00 ;
0.00 I
0.00
O.OO I

o.oo;
0.00
j

i

1

1

i

i
i

1

310.00 1

!

1

1

!
!

!
1*56.00 !

•

*

i
i
i

2Q7 rr\ i

,

•

1

•
1
654.50 '

»

1

I

i

1

!

1

!

i

•

'
'

I
J^
I
I

1

O.vO ;
310.00J
0.00 |
0.00 I
1117.50 1
0.00!
0.00 j
O.Ou j
0.CO !
0.00 1
0.00 !
0.00 j

!
!

o.oo j
o.oo j

j
I
1

0.00 1
0.00 |
9064.15 1

1

!

j

!
i

;
•
•
-

i

L_

:

1

•
;

,

•

i

1

6204.1* '

i
!

1

I

1

1

o.oo i

i
i

i

0.00
0.00
0.00 j
0.00 1

0.0U!

140739.32 I

1

:

1

,

i

i

1

•

!

1i

i

•

!

t

1

•

•

i
i

i
• 40r*«n 7 7 '

*J09.3$ •

1

i
1S00.00

572S*.y3

1*M0. $7

0.00

0.00 :

!
o.oo!

l
i

WHEN RECORDED. HAIL Ttf;
DILLMAN ELECTRIC
1034? South Lor1dan Lane
Sandy. Utah 84U9Z

RECORDED ATRajUBT OF

eoumr RECORDER
DEPUTE <s»<e*

$?q?\)o
NOTICE

OF

m, low

LIEN

LANE DILLMAN for DILLMAN ELECTRIC
The undersigned
hereby
notice of intention to hold and claim a
a sole proprletorsnip
"
nci C U j gives
y

J^OT.<h*BffT^^

0Wned by

pH^S^^T'lTO

c5Unl7r

Utah 84065-4104

PROPERTY ADEKCSS: 6642 South Stone Mill Drive - Salt Lake City, Utah

84121

ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PUT "F" SUBDIVISION
(22-23-302-022)

•The amount demanded hereby 1s $ 14,000.00 + $loq Lien Fee + lWntPerMonth + Atty Fees
owing to the undersigned for *furn1shing materials used in *performing labor upon the
construction ^alteration *add1t1on to *repa1r of a *bu1ld1ng *structure ^improvement
upon the above described property.
+STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS
The undersigned *furn1shed said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson
who was the purported owner/contractor
. such being done by the underslqned by the terms and conditions of which the undersigned did agree to furnish labor and materials for the
Installation of the rough & finish electrlcaTsystems.
in consideration of paymenj; to .the undersigned therefore as follows; 30 days net - Payment
1n full upon completion of claimants work.
and under which contract the first ^material was furnished *labor was performed on the
14th day of Oune
, 1993 and the last was so furnished or performed on the
13th day of August
, 1993 and for all of which "^materials *labor the undersigned
became entitled to $ l4T000.00 , which 1s the reasonable value thereof, and on which
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $ 14,000.00
after deducting all just
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a H e n by
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended.
DATED:31 August 1993
DILLMAN ELECTRIC
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

to

ss.

Lane Dlllman
_ , belno first duly sworn deposes and says that
of
Dlllman
he/xJ» is the owner
_ _
_ _ ^Electric
_ _
1n
the
foregoing
rtotice
of
Lien;
that
hefall*
has
read
and
knows of the contents thereof
"hlth ? ? * t r u V $ *2h l s M « * ° ™ knowledge and belief; and that he/SK* has appropriate
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of L1en on behalf of the H e n claimant, a< U s

Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this
of
August
, 19 93

r~^=r

443&it200South#S j
~ ~ b * i Cty. Utah M i l l !
CommlitJpnE '—

31st day

'*mmli(*^-

!

*HEN RECORDED. MAJfTO:

M

RECOTOEDATRHHJESrOF

%*J?^!£ *"u""""r ***********

MEHR'MAID POOL EQUIPMENT SALES, INC,
7515 South State Street
Mldvale. Utah 84047

OWE /^ff

Mfit&l'tf*

MIH NXON k riMECOUWYRECOOa
DBVm

55*15111

NOTICE

OF

LIEN

The undersigned DONNA S. MEHR for MEHR MAID POOL EQUIPMENT SALFS. INC.
hereby gives notice of Intention tofiold ana c m m a
lien upon the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by
MATTHEW C. * SHERI M. MATTSON, h/w, J.T.
and located in SALT LAKE
County,
Utah, more particularly described as follows:
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South Buckwheat Way - Riverton, Utah 84065-4104
pRQPEkTV AbDftESS: 6642 South Stone Mill Drive - Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT M F" SUBDIVISION
(22-23-302-022)

The amount demanded hereby is $3,250.00 + $100 Lien Fee + 2%IntPerMonth + Atty Fees
owing to the undersigned for ^furnishing materials used 1n *perform1ng labor upon the
construction *alteration *addit1on to *repa1r of a *bu1lding ^structure ^improvement
upon the above described property,
»STRIK£ OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS
The undersigned ^furnished said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson
.
6550 South 900 East SLC,UT8412i.who was the purported owner/developer
, such being done by the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which the undersigned did agree tofurnlsh labor, materials & equipment for the
installation of an Indoor 16' X 36' pool with all attendant operation equipment associateftheret
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: Prnqrp^ivp paympnt-*
with paympnt in full upon completion of claimants work

and under which contract tne first *materia1 was furnished *labor was performed on the
12th day of April
, 1993 and the last was so furnished or performed on the
13th day of August
, 1993 and for all of which ^materials *labor the undersigned
became entitled to $ 3,250.00
, which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0•
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $3,250.00
after deducting all just
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a lien by
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Jtah
UtahJSode
Annotated, 1953,
1953, as
as /Amended.
JSode Annotated,
DATED:1 September 1993
MEHR MAID PQQL EQUIPMENT SALES, INC.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

Donna S. Mehr
. being first duly sworn deposes and says that
flBCshe 1s the secretary/treasurer
of Mehr Main Pool Equipment Sales, Inc.
in the foregoing Notice of L1en; t h a t W s h e has read and knows of the contents thereof
which are true as toXWWher own knowledge and belief; and thatXWUtshe has appropriate
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of Lien on behalf of the H e n claimant, as its
secretary/treasurer
pursuant to corporate resolution; and that KiWshe
acknowledged to me. thatXXtfshe executed the same. f )
s *n
/?
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this 1st
of
September
% ig93

day

WM.IxSSaL^HNSONi
445 East 200 Sort) #S |
earUtoC*/. Utah 64111!

j\.

f) /ILIJLK,

(/Jark-

WHEN RECORDED. M A I l O ) :
BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS
JW2 South 1410 West S t r e e T
West Jordan, Utah U40im ~ "

RtttaUEDAT REQUEST Of

NOTICE

PPM*

jg^ti/

OF

LIEN

pt/p**

BUCKNER, SR., for BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS
hereby gives notice of Intention to hold and claim a
lien upon the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by
County,
MATTHEW C« & SHERI H. MATTSON, h/w, J.T.
and located in SALT LAKE
Utah, more particularly described as follows:
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South Buckwheat Way - Rlverton, Utah 84065-4104
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 6642 South Stone Mill Drive - Salt Lake City. Utah 84121
The undersigned JAMES R<

ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT "F" SUBDIVISION
(22-23-302-022)

The amount demanded hereby 1s $ 6,079.85 + $100 Lien Fee + ^ " ^ ^ " ^ ^ *tty FeeS
owing to the undersigned for *furn1sh1ng materials used 1n * $ W f i ^
the
construction Alteration *add1tion to ^repair of a *bu11ding *structure *1mprovement
upon the above described property.
+STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS
The undersigned *furn1shed said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson
who was the purported owner/contractor
. such being done by the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which the undersigned did agree to furnish building materials
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: 2% by the 10th of
the month - 30 days net.
_r_r_^_^T_1
and under which contract the first *material was furnished *labor was performed on the
30th day of April
19 93 and the last was so furnished or performed on the
16th day of August
19 93 and for all of which ^materials *labor the undersigned
became entitled to $6,079.85
which is the reasonable* value thereof, and on which
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0•
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $ 6,079.85
after deducting all just
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a lien by
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended.
WVEDz 2 September 1993
(W,^
BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

j

ss.

.
tlamp* R- R n r k n o r . Sr(
_ , being^ first duly
, . — - -and
» - *~J*
.,»*
j
sworn _deposes
says *that
heA**X is the Administrative Manager
of BMC WEST BUILDING MATERIALS
in the foregoing nonce or Lien; that heMM has read and knows of the contents thereof
which are true as to h1s/ftt»xown knowledge and belief; and that he**frx has appropriate
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of L1en on behalf of the HehTlaimant, as Its
Administrative Manager
_
. pursuant to corporate resolution; and that he WW
cKnowieoged to me that he/teWt executed the same. .
*^
ac!

1^

SCAJLAU.

Acknowledged, subscribed aj/d swoi
sworn before me t h i s
°f September
19 93

& I

2nd

MMlfP

day

RECORDED XT REQUEST OF

flHEN RECORDED. HAIL TO;
RFWPRAUPLUMBINR CONTRACTORS
Q M O South Indian Ridge Drive
Sandy. Utah 84092

^M:

DATE:

TUP 910a /tim*

KATIE

COUNT RECORDER

DEPUTft

tyiczzt

N.OI!C£ 0 £

^y<

ml4>*£>

lllH

The u n d e r s i g n e d SCOTT G. STOWERS

for GENERAL-PLUMBING CONTRACTORShereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a
H e n upon'the property and Improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by
MATTHEW C. * SHERI N. MATTSON.;h/w. J.T.
and located in SALT LAKE
County,
Utah, more particularly described as follows:
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South .Buckwheat Way - Rlverton, Utah 84065-4104
PROPERTY ADD"KESS: 6642 South Stone M111 Drive - Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

ALL OF LOT 641, MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT «F" SUBDIVISION
(22-23-302-022)

The amount demanded hereby 1s $6.438.95 + $100 Lien Fee + IWntPerMonth + Atty Fegs
owing to the undersigned for *furn1sh1ng materials used In *perform1ng labor upon the
construction ^alteration 'addition to *repa1r of a *bu11d1ng *structure *1mprovement
upon the above described property.
'STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS
The undersigned *fum1shed said materials to *was employed by Matt Mat-.t.^nn

t who was the purported ownpr/contractor.
, such being done by the undersigned by the terms and condltlons of which the undersigned did agree to furnish labor and materials for the Installation of the finish plumbing systems & extras.
^
.
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: Progressive Payments
with payment In full upon completion of claimants work.
and
under which
contract the1993
first and
*material
*labororwas
performed
jjBjLfcday
of, JlajL.
the lastwas
wasfurnished
so furnished
performed
on on
thethe
3rd jfay
day of
of September t 19 93 and for all of which ^materials *1abor the undersigned
became entitled to $ 6.438.95
, which Is the reasonable value thereof, and on which
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ _ _ - 0 leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $ 6,438.95
after deducting all just
zredits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a H e n by
/Irtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended.
WED:

3 September 1993

&f.i.ti
GENERAL-PLUMBING CONTRACTORS

TATE OF UTAH
QUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss.

Scott G. Stowers

, being first duly sworn deposes and says that

V*a« 1s the
owner
_ General-Plumbing„ Contractors„
of
i the foregoing Wotice of Lien; that he&ft* has read and knows of the contents thereof
!u ?r* *"****
*? hls^eoxown knowledge and belief; and that he/jbevhas appropriate
thorlty to sign the foregoing Notice of L1en on behalf of the Hen claimant, as Its
v^Lln.,1 f W B f l i L , u ^
•WWWp«XlWXflWW^
and that he/xXK

knowledge* to me that he/*&& executed the same.
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me t h i s
of
September

3rd

day

ytteUrf?

w.rr_ Mr*«w*X JOHNSON f
444 & « 200 South #6 I
• r t t l j f r t C*y, Utah 64111 {

§

Vy Commit tiro ExcfcM I

A/ L..J

- > - • «

HAND

INFORMATION
Wm. Lowell Johnson
Sue Burningham

445 East 200 South, Suite 5
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bus. Phone:

14 September 1993

(801) 363-0071

Matthew C. & Sheri K. Mattson
11848 South Buckwheat Way
Riverton, Utah
84065-4104
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Mattson:

RE: NOTICE OF LIEN

Please be advised that on 3 September 1993, a lien was placed of record at the
Salt Lake County Recorder's office by Stenton W. Wilcox & Associates, 3843
Tangiers Circle, West Valley City, Utah 84119 (see copy attached) in the amount
of $3,488.25 plus interest and fees.
This lien is for labor and materials furnished to the property described in the
Notice of Lien, and represents an obligation which you are responsible for.
Please contact Stenton W. Wilcox, telephone (801) 964-1147, or c/o Stenton W.
Wilcox & Associates, afore-mentioned address, regarding payment of this matter.
Sincerely,
FIRST HAND INFORMATION

wlj
attachment
Cert. #P-711-414-340

0551v

CONTEMPORARY FURNITURE, INC.

•.' \j U w - —- —- —

Ccrontemporary
rurniture
'

8-91

WEST ONE BANK, UTAH
P.O. BOX 30177
SALT LAKE CfTY, UTAH 84130

31-4
1240

5r

CHECK NO.

6550 SOUTH 900 EAST • (801) 262-9608
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84121

DATE

^7-^7-?^
PAY

J^fytt^U-tel/

TO THE

I OH- OO - S 739l,-i3

c c J. 3 is' i: I t itOGODt, li; L 10 10 E 3 2 111* 7*

CHECK AMOUNT

-?,&#'•

~*Z-u*£k>?*'-

- «•. .* •&*- •• •-• '#,|AC->".-? '&*&-; > ^s^'^STMrs? 'rn."

•: • •• -*F.4h:

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

RECORDED AT REQUEST OF

STFNTON w. uTirny t / K W T A T P ;

843 Tanoiers Circle
f *Wpst
VallPv IMtv. I l f h M11Q-

,

^«^g^00UKIYRECOROER

f&£>22&
N O T I C E

OF

L I E N

The undersigned

STENTON W. WILCOX f o r STENTON W. WILCOX & ASSOCIATES
hereby gives notice of i n t e n t i o n to hold and claim a
l i e n upon the property and Improvements thereon owned and reputed to be owned by
MATTHFW C. ft SHFpi M. MATTSON. h/w. J . J and located I n SALT LAKE
County,
Utah, more p a r t i c u l a r l y described as f o l l o w s :
OWNERS ADDRESS: 11848 South Buckwheat Way - R i v e r t o n , Utah 84065-4104
PRUPLR1Y ADDRESS: 6642 South Stone M i l l Drive - S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121

ALL OF LOT 6 4 1 , MILL HOLLOW ESTATES - PLAT "F" SUBDIVISION
(22-23-302-022)

The amount demanded hereby is $3,488.25 + $100 Lien Fee + 1%%Int Per Month + Atty Fees
owing to the undersigned for *furnishing materials used in ^performing labor upon the
construction *alterat1on *addit1on to *repair of a *bu1ld1ng *structure ^improvement
upon the above described property.
+STRIKE OUT UNNECESSARY WORDS
The undersigned ^furnished said materials to *was employed by Matt Mattson
, —
, who was the purported owner/contractor
such being done by the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which the undersigned did agree to furnish labor for the installation of
interior tile systems.
_ „ _ _ _
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows: Progressive payments
with payment in full upon completion of claimants work.
and under which contract the first *material was furnished *labor was performed on the
19th day of July
, 19JJ3 and the last was so furnished or performed on the
13th day of August
i 19 93 and for all of which Materials *labor the undersigned
became entitled to $3,488.25
, which 1s the reasonable value thereof, and on which
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting to $ -0leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $3,488.25
after deducting all just
credits and offsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and claims a lien.by
virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code Anrjptated, 1953, as Amended.
?

DATED: 2 September 1993

^-^^^S^^<£^/^^2^

^

STENTON W. WILCOXftASSOCIATFS
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

, being first duly sworn deposes and says that
Stenton W. Wilcox
heXXKfc is the owner
,.. &
, Associates
^__^
of Stenton W. Wilcox
in the foregoing Notice of Lien; that he/KKtt has read and knows of"the contents thereof
which are true as to hisXKKK own knowledge and belief; and that he/jfe* has appropriate
authority to sign the foregoing Notice of Lien on behalf of the lien claimant, as its
owner
, KQCKXOCXKKXXCCXMKMKXXKXXKXItNXMNX and that he/Xfc*
acknowledged to me that heX*K* executed the same.
/ s S
Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me this
of Septembpr

WM. ISWILL JOHNSON I
'446 Eft* 200 Sou* #5 I
* * U * » C * y . U » h 84111 J
Ito Oommfc*lon Expires I
' Unwy 11.199)
I
^••i f »— — — — ——fcS

2nd,

day

4m<w&«<&

Lsgtftd

Vtt(X)

EARNEST MONEY.SALES AGREEMENT
IARNE8T MONEY MOIIPT

• No(0)

The undersigned Buyer
}JlMttK.'\S'Q']P^ f-^Ifl'Si'flft
, J, fiO
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount J 1 C/l ^Nllftria
•tfffil(arAs V "

DEFENDANT'
CXHlBITj

>

hereby deposits with Broke!
_Ool(ar8($J^^2

•try;

ilch shall be depositeo in accordance with applicable State Law. •«•
okerage

~

W

j

7M

? i - ; - ' " : t ' - " * j ^ " ~ v ; / ;> - -• «\ ••-•> -jt i ' \ t
^ ^ * £ i - * < -',. A *~" ~" -w' v~"

Phone Number

'"'••"

OFFER TO PURCHASE
• 1 . PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY Is given to. secure ^and.appl/ on' the 'purchasetj?f the property situated ar
,-ihAK,

subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements orrighteof way% government* patents or state
i
deeds of record approved by Buyer in
accordance with Section G, Said property is owned bv M(Hf
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES?:^
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
^IMPROVED RWL PROPERTY

U,(fH*>/)/)

T

^('tiffX** sellers, and is more particularly described

D Other..

.P^Vacarrt L o t ^ D Vacant Acreage
Q ^ r n m e r c i a l ^ f f Residential

ntiM/tV

D^Condo ^ . 0 Other-,

(a) Included ItemscUniessTexcluded below, this* sale "snail Jnclude all fixtures^and -any^okthe^Items shownjn.Section <A, if <presently, attached Jo\the property;
The following persdrjalproperty shall also be included^ .this "sale and conveyed under separate^Bill-of»Sale with warrantiesasiertftter*
. , - . „^.

'H*'QQ(it-'nrw-rfv

(b) Excluded Items^The following Items afeVpectfically'exc/udec/ from'-thisTaie:_

-

.... . .-

(c) CONNECTIONS, l.UYiLITIES«AND - OTHER s RIGHTS., Seller represents that the, propsrty^includes ;,the- following ^improvements. in the^purchase pricey
D well
D connected ^. * D other
E^ public sewer . ETconnected
.[^electricity* -:-i [^connected
•
irrigation
water
/
secondary
system
D septic tank. ED connected
dftngress & egress by private ease'ment
• other sanitary system
' # of shares
"Company:
s t ^ dedicated road . D paved.
0$ public water" ^connected
D private water • connected

D TV antenna
Qf natural gas

T

D master antenna^ tSfprewired'
* E connected

,o«_0^^-S

(d) Survey. A certified Survey • shall be furnished at the expense (

'ffcurb and gutter*
! U other rights'.

_

_

w/•P>.

.prior to closing, D shall not be" furnished.
(e) Buyer Inspection. feUyer has'made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section:1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts It in its present physical
condition, except: . J L - ! i » S £ i :f}ddjr\ni
ISY\ )
._.
i _

W Wh^yVi^)SOi'\m\/L..

2. PURCHASE PRICE AN D RNANCING. The total purchase price for the proper^ I s ^ l i ^
-T—-

JJ_L.

$

.

,

:r

,

;

-. "Dollars (tl^Sls^ffXK

which represents theaforedescribed^RNEST MONEY DEPOSIJ:
representing the approximate balance, of,CASH .DOWN PAYMENT

J /

>

A

' j whteh shall b* pfl?H «c

/ \ .'

','".,

. , 'v \ ^ . "

faii'^T
:

.**>

representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer^
which obligation bears interest a t _

1 % per annum with monthly payments of $

;

which include:'^ D principal?^
^P^entfng'thV^proVimate^^^^^

/|^iC»CO

_,
additional existing mortgage; t r & s t ^ ^

*assujhed^BuyerV;wtiichj)bllgat^
which include:-i . U principal;^ U Interest;
U taxes; . U Insurance;• condo fees;-- D othei
representing balance.Jf.any, Includina proceeds from, a newmortgage loah%- c^seller/financlngcto be paid as follows:

to*bi
_.
-tt--Jn£xr

r

OtherTOTAL PURCHASE PRICE
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also'ap&iy) and/or.obtaln outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts';
to assume and/or procure Sa me and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees'
to make application within I . JV- { r\
^'days after Sellers'acceptance of this Agreement 'to^assiime'^ho underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing a!
an interest rate not to exceecj
. %" If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption ancVor financing within*.
days after Seller's acceptance:.
of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice, Seller agrees to pay up to
.
points, not to exceed $—-,..
In addition, seller:agrees to pay $, • y
% to be used for Buyer's other loan costs,

mortgage loan discount

J&fe

| & . CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TTTUE^ Seller represents^m

title to the property in fee simple D is purchasing the property under a real

itafA ArtntrJJLTt T r a n s f e r rtf &AilAr*tt AumArchtrt lntAfAftt ehatl h A m a H a oe ea« lArtk^ln C A M ! A M C CAII A > > «mrAA* «SN lnml^K A A M < anH marlrAtoHlA tttlA f n tho r\rs\r\Artvj •nk'iA*t

£6. SELLERS
SW
WARRANTIES. lniaddition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:
g

Sot nAdiMnm]2M,M^^-*•'-

'

-yptk>ns to>hA ahova and Section C snail hA*limita^tn W f n l l n w l n g ^ ' ^

*t SPECtALCONSIDERATIONS ANDCO^NGENqES^
^ - t tn closings

/ ^ ^

T

j

/

V:/ v .

y

-

^ »

•

-

'

" ^ ^ - ^

v «' 5 **f,'*?-***^'**s :

offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied

A

<^» v ..••. ^iv.H'f*; t>^»'»T«^ ^ T
; &K'-.«d.]eS'K«:.^>K 7 >]& C -^ i^Uhf f.*-r'U*rfW;4>iqfCR!}S-.** f f U * A o 4 fcJ-t , H O ( K t i . ^ H ^ A * ^ = . * J O I * r *• .» I ^ ^ v . ; ti> -£«*«V •**-• i

*rf^ r* -t** »<4; * * ^ ^ t
• ^'::«,v r Ji- • •: i?-

r>

-

f^

'*

'** t'v

i-.i<)C

- \
r e . CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on'oir hAfora-

UQO

/

(S

'"' ''* "''*t

is ^ 3

at a reasonable location to be designated by

Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with

ten discJosureof the agency relationships) was providedV ^ i m / h a i ^ l ^ ^ ^ t V Vguyer's initials M i O (>« 0 Seiler*sihttiaJs:?^'.» - f e H 3 ^ io.??i^-'-Ifir:GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISEINDICATED ABOVE, TOE GENERAL PROVISiotfSECriONS'ONTHE REVBRS5^
ACCEPTED BY^THE BUYER AND SELLER AND1ARE/INCORPORATED INTO "THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.:*' l t:.-~?'$$
V

^

^%

HEREOF HAVE BEEN ' ^

purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
feZ1Z AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchas
t i v e untir.

fe^cy

/AM/P'Mt"l-T-jfcf. ^ > ( 0

, ^ Q ' 7 J ,jn AccApt thk offer. Unless accepted,, this offer shall lapse and the Agent.shall return the EARNEST

^arVthe^^

te'^^rrr/^

(buyer's Signature)

(Phone) vf.

(Address)

r.i-t^ '-:•>"*"•• ; r ^ \

buyer's Signature)r^^ ^ ' ^

v

• > ^ ^ * * * } : , T O a t e y : ^ ^ < ' V $ ^ ^ T ^ * ' - i - ^ ^ - - * - ^ (Address), > * - ^ ^

*'*

<

(SSN/TAX ID)
;s^'^'^;

^"^ (Phone) - j ^ . ^ - ' - * - 4

(SSN/TAX ID)
m t

5HECKONE.,
'..y.& - : ^ ...
^ ^ ^ E r T T A N C E OROFFER TO PURCH^E:^lieT^ereby.ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms: and.conditions specified a b o v e ^ ^ ^ \ ^ •?• ^
tpl^REJECTIONiSeller herAhy RgJgCTSihA fr^inq^offAr^^^W-' : < ^ ^ V (SAIIA^S initials)^?a3;4iiir^ft t, >aj»^;i't:4ffgifr.^j j ^ ^ ^ w - n i : * - ^ . r. •> • ^ '.
:8PiCOUNTER"OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoingoffer SUBJECT TO the exceptions'or modifications as specified below or.m the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance: Buyer shall have until
(AWPhtf
•"•
*-• - 19.^
to accept the terms
.l^pecrfied^lpw.^^ •,.,: ^ - ^ : ; 4 v : v ^ * ^ ? ^
.&.:^..,^v<^5r^*^^Ji[Vi,«r*«pW>i.^^^:V:^>--lCr^-i6'-*"!;,
.jfeg& -t * *-"y*v^ J^"-Vi-;': *-•.:

•

. ;

'.^,-v

^;"... •

v. ' • • • ^ ^ • • ^ • - ' ? f f ' X ^ •

"**

;.;•.•?/-• J: ^ . - ^ " j r «•-

;-rr^^v,^.
•

m-ixj??*.-**-

'.'

•- ,-*•

'•.•••>.-•*

^ - - ' ^ ^ ^ ^ / - v . i p ^

:f *•.*->*-

{teller's Signature).,

'•

••;-'•

-

:

—

:

-

-

•

-

'

^

.

t
v

-

:

^

^-.:-.feV?..-^

•

.

:

(Address) -.

^' ; j f

""

- - • >- •
>.^ . *

>r. _

:
•

-

r

-

4

^ ^ • * - •..- n (Phone) &••;•:.:••• >;.. , (SSN/TAX ID)
(SSN/TAX ID)

••*

i ' ' ^S

;»•,COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the'COUNTER OFFER with modifications'™ attached A d d t n d u m / ^ ^ A • ^ " ^ v ' - | r v ^ - > ^

buyer's Signature) s '

Pate) ?

r*i (Time)

(Buyer's Signature) r.- <sV."

(Date)

'•'

(Time)

. J|State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with'copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures^ (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).

j | | ^ ; P I acknowledge reoelpt of* final copyV^

v •*
Dttt
Dttt

•^-i-B. L I 1 OAfRonallw cAufiAd A final arsrvj of thA fnrAnoIno AorAAmant baarino all SionaturSS tO be mailed On.

Ottt

.,19.

-by

REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE COMMISSION
ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS
The following are ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS for the payment of real estate brokerage commissions on areal estate
traiisacdonde^MmMEirnest Money-Sales' Agreement dated fv- r>*J—'
«nr'
<««2i~.—.

w**„n

faAJn

if rUAnifSAn

Buyer of the real property

-?/«s Seller and ; - '

describedasfo]]ow:j£iJi££^£lLL

LISTING/SELLING BROKERAGE INFORMATION

listing Brokerage

Selling Brokerage

Listing Agent

Business Address,

'-Business

Phone

A

d

Phone

d

r

e

s

s

J

P

Selling Agent

h

o

n

e

Phone

BROKERAGE COMMISSION
To the extent these ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS modify any prior agreementsT>etween the Buyer or Seller aridjhe
Listing and/or Selling Brokerages, regarding the payment of a real estate brokerage commission or fee, the terms of
these Escrow Instructions shall supersede those prior agreements. ^The total real estate brokerage commission to be
paid'in this transaction is $ /tf/^jffwhich represents ^> % of .Unagreed sales price of $ SlfifjiCu
The
undersigned authorize and direct the closing office to disburse the brokerage commission directly to the'Listing and
Selling Brokerages in the following manner $
to the Listing Brokerage; $; — Q ~
to the Selling

Brokerage;Other(explain) Thp

tigCM/i

U Or^3?lA\^r&^l/l6lua

IS U

3%

The undersigned agree to the above terms.

Listing Broker

Date

Selling Broker.

Date

SIGNATURE(S) OF INDIVIDUALS) PAYING THE COMMISSION (BUYER OR SELLER) ARE
REQUIRED ONLY IF THIS AGREEMENT MODIFIES A PRIOR COMMISSION AGREEMENT.

%**,<—M.
Buyer

Date

Seller-

Buyer

Date

Seller

-

This form approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission July 1,1987

**/•?*.
Date
Date

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD .TTmTrTAjr, . T 7TfiTIli rrrr
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE o J ^ f t r W ' 3 1

* * *

District

JUN n 1996
Deputy Cbi*

PROMAX DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CIV 950903616 CV
MATT MATTSON and SHERI MATTSON,
Defendants.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
on Tuesday-Wednesday, March 12-13, 1996

For the Plaintiff;

WAYNE H. BRAUNBERGER
Attorney at Law
302 West 5400 South, #103
Murray, Utah 84107
263-0300

For the Defendants

G. BRENT SMITH
Attorney at Law
180 South

300 West,

Salt Lake City, Utah
532-5100

#170

84101

ANNA M. BENNETT, C.S.R.
License No. 22-106796-7801
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 535*5203
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A

Again I don't recall seeing this cost breakdown.

really don't.

I

Doesn't mean that I didn't, but I don't recall

it.
Q

Look at Exhibit 10 and 11.

A

Okay.

Q

What do those represent?

A

Again, trust deed note is a promise to pay us back

monies that we are going to lend.
THE COURT:

We already know that, don't we,

Counsel?
MR. BRAUNBERGER:
Q

Yeah.

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Sorry, your Honor.

Do you have any recollection

concerning what the nature of the agreement was between
Promax and Mattsons concerning building the Mattson home?
A

Vaguely, just vaguely, but I can tell you what I do

remember is that the home was to be built on a cost-plus is
what I feel was presented to us because it was going to be in
a show or a Parade of Homes, we were able to get a special
loan origination fee because of the advertisement part, that
we all knew from day one that there would be probably extras
and that we had to establish, because of deadlines, a price
and if in fact those things would go over, then it certainly
would be the responsibility again from other transactions
that we have gone through of the responsibility of the individual or increase the loan balance on the long term in order
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to cover it.
Q

That's basically what I remember.

Okay.

Do you remember whether Mattsons brought

money in during the course of the loan to supplement the
amounts?
A

I don't remember that.

Q

Mr. Barraclough, let me show you what's been marked

as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 42 and have you identify that, if
you can.
A

It looks like a computer generated statement.

It

would be probably from Far West Bank as far as disbursements
on the account.
MR. SMITH:

Judge, we object to this.

We have

never seen this.
THE COURT:

Well, whether or not you've seen it,

the witness is not testifying as to what it is.

He's saying

what it may well be, so there's no foundation so far yet for
it to be offered.
MR. SMITH:

All right. We had written a letter to

Counsel asking for everything he intended to use.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll hear you when it's offered.

So far it hasn't been offered.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Do you know whether or not

that's from Far West Bank?
A

It appears to match their format.

Q

Do any of the numbers match up with this particular
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A

Did I forget what?

Q

That he said that to you?

A

Again it didn't strike me as a serious note because

I didn't think it had anything to do with me.
Q

So he told you that he was in a lawsuit with Phil

Bates, asked you a question about cost.

You said it was a

set fee?
A

I don't think I said set fee.

Q

It seems to me that we went in for a certain dollar

figure.
A

Okay.

Q

Okay.

A

Okay.

That's for the loan amount.

Now, back up and look at the cost-plus,

okay, there's a big difference there and if you're talking
about terminology here, let's define some terminology first.
Q

Okay.

We all know that the loan amount was for a

set fee.
A

And that's what I was thinking in terms of —

Q

Let me read this to you and you can tell me if this

is correct then.
Matt, this is Matt speaking.

"Yeah, see, we went

in for the 190,000 'cause he says this is what it's going to
cost.
"Mark. Uh-huh."
A

Okay.

What does that mean?

Uh-huh.

Am I agreeing
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1

enough that there were yes and no's on a lot of this stuff.

2

Q

Does this one look familiar?

3

A

It does,

4

Q

On this form does it not say construction contract?

5

Is that not one of the categories?

6

A

It says that on the form, yes.

7

Q

And does REQ stand for required?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And does REC stand for received?

10

A

Right.

11

Q

Why would both these be checked?

12

A

Because apparently it was in the file.

13

Q

Okay, so there would have been a construction

14
15
16

contract?
A

Again getting back to definitions, a construction

contract can be a cost breakdown.

17

Q

Well, I understand that.

18

A

Okay.

19

Q

Typically the cost breakdown is the contract,

20

correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And careful builders are clear typically to say

23

that it is a cost-plus when it's a cost-plus, and that is

24

typically in the papers, correct?

25

A

I disagree.

With the people that I work with, that
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is not a normal way of doing business.
Q

It's your experience that they're left open?

A

Pretty much.

Q

And those open-ended contracts don't say cost-plus?

A

I assume probably in my 18 years of cost-plus con-

tracts, maybe a half a dozen at most.
Q

Half a dozen?

That's it?

A

Yeah.

Q

Okay, and out of those half a dozen, don't those

typically say that they're cost-plus?
A

Yes.
MR. SMITH:

Thank you.

to admit this as Exhibit 1.

Your Honor, we would move

I apologize.

We had no idea

this was going to be an issue.
THE COURT:

It won't be Exhibit 1.

It will be 43.

Is there any objection to this document,
Mr. Braunberger?
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

THE COURT:
Q

No objection.

Very well.

(By Mr. Smith)

It's received.

Now, getting back to the plans in

front of you, do you have any experience in looking at plans?
A

Very little.

Q

Okay.

Do you have enough so that you could recog-

nize a bedroom or a bathroom?
A

Oh, absolutely.
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1

of Homes, correct?

2

A

Correct.

3

Q

And wasn't it your representation to Matt Mattson

4

that about a hundred thousand people come through the Parade

5

of Homes?

6

A

I may have said that, yes.

7

Q

And that's why builders are so eager to give dis-

8

counts and so forth to advertise their talents and their

9

materials?

10

A

Builders and suppliers, yes.

11

Q

And these discounts are only given for the Parade

12

of Homes, correct?

13

A

Discounts were given, yes.

14

Q

Yes, and Matt Mattson received —

I'm just using

15

the number loosely, I think it was something like $10,000 of

16

free counter tops for the Parade of Homes from one of your

17

suppliers.

18

received that if he were not in the Parade of Homes?

Is it your opinion that he would not have

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

He would have paid what, retail?

21

A

I believe.

22

Q

Okay, and isn't it true that in your experience the

23

only time, especially in times right now where the construe-

24

tion business is pretty busy, the only discounts people get

25

are those in the Parade of Homes, correct?

97

THE COURT:

You may.

MR. SMITH:

To save the Court some time, we're

going to give Counsel the liens and then if he deems they
were filed consecutively, then we'll just stipulate.
THE COURT:
Q

Okay.

(By Mr. Smith)

Now, it was your testimony that

there was nothing in writing from the prospective buyer to
Matt Mattson's home for the price of $560,000; wasn't that
your testimony?
A

That we had in offer in writing?

Q

That there was not an offer in writing.
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

acterized the testimony.

Your Honor, I think that mischarI think he testified he didn't see

anything in writing.
Q

(By Mr. Smith)

Okay.

Did you see this —

what

appears to be a contract for the sale of a home for $565,000
by a company that you are affiliated with, broker?
A

I have seen it after the sale did not go through.

Q

Okay.

Do you have any idea why the sale did not go

through?
A

House wasn't sold.

Q

Do you know why the house didn't sell?

A

I believe there's a dispute between —

not the

house itself, but a dispute on amounts of the furniture that
was included in this contract is why it didn't sell.

101

1

Q

Okay, so you wouldn't know if this particular buyer

2

said —

3

can't buy this house because there suddenly popped up six

4

liens and I'm not going to buy a lawsuit"?

did this particular buyer say to you personally, "I

5

A

No.

6

Q

So other than the dispute you wanted to be the

7

salesman, the real estate agent on this deal.

8

don't real estate agents investigate why buyers suddenly get

9

cold feet?

10

A

Typically

Well, I did not have a listing agreement.

I backed

11

off of the deal when Matt refused to sign a listing agreement

12

as the time that another agent was going to submit the papers

13

to Matt.

14

Q

Do you know a Laurie Gale?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Did you ever say to Laurie Gale, "This deal's not

17

going to close because I burned it by liening it, liening the

18

property"?

19

A

Not in those words, no.

20

Q

What words?

21

A

I —

Laurie and her husband Marty Gale were

22

involved in a situation with liens on a home and I probably

23

—

and I did represent that there were liens on this home.

24

Q

How did you know there had been liens?

25

A

I dealt with the subcontractors.
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and then it was just kind of filled in in pencil there. Why
was that?
A

Why was it done that way?

Can you tell the Judge?

No, idea.
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

We have no objection to the

admission of that.
THE COURT:
Q

All right, 55's received.

(By Mr. Smith)

Okay.

In the exhibits that your

attorney presented, Exhibit 9, this is the exhibit that
you're claiming was the guideline, correct?
A

This was the exhibit that was submitted to the bank

for the $190,200 amount.
Q
—

Now, in your deposition you testified that the bank

in fact, please tell the Judge what it was the bank said

to you or how it was that you understood that you were to
come up with a $190,200 figure.
A

That was the number I was directed to for the

amount of the construction loan.
Q

And who directed you to come to that number?

A

Probably, I believe, Mark Barraclough and Matt

Mattson.
Q

Okay.

Now, you heard Mark Barraclough's testimony

that he wouldn't direct somebody to come up with certain
figures.

Can you reconcile the two testimonies for me so I

can understand if there appears to be an apparent conflict?
Can you explain to me how the two justify?
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1

A

2

free, yes,

3

Q

4

We did have a supplier give the alarm system for

Okay, and that was about a $4500 savings to

Mr. Mattson, correct?

5

A

I disagree with —

I don't know what the amount is.

6

Q

Okay, and wasn't it true that an —

on Exhibit

7

No. 9 you have $4,500 written down as budgeted for stucco.

8

Is it true that he was to get the stucco free but he was to

9

pay for labor?

10

A

No.

11

Q

Okay, and now on this exhibit that your attorney

12

gave me it shows here that you ended up paying $10,000 plus

13

an extra $1100 for the stucco which was $6,600 more than

14

Exhibit 9.

15

A

Yes, please.

16

Q

Okay.

17
18
19
20

Would you like me to show you that?

Where it says stucco —

you see how you have

$4500 budgeted and then at the end it ends up being $11,000?
A

That's what it shows. Again this budget amount

didn't even reflect the house we ended up with.
Q

Okay, but again, so you're off like $6600.

Did you

21

ever tell Matt that the stucco was going to be more than

22

initially budgeted?

23

A

You bet.

24

Q

Okay, and the initial painting contract allows for

25

$4,000 for painting.

Did you not tell my client that he'd
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A

No.

Q

Didn't he receive a lot of the roofing materials

free?
A

I believe he got some discounts.

I don't know

exactly how much.
Q

But he ended up paying $3,939 more than the guide-

lines, correct?
A

If that's what it shows, correct.
THE COURT:

What item is that again, Counsel?

MR. SMITH:

Roofing and the roofers.

THE COURT:

Where's that?

THE WITNESS:
Q

On page 1 or 2?

Page 1.

(By Mr. Smith) And your brother is the roofer,

correct?
A

My brother did install the roofing, yes.

Q

And as we said, Matt did get a really nice alarm

system free.
A

Correct.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Counsel, back on that point

about the roofing, there was $1500 budgeted, but what was
paid?
MR. SMITH:

The amount budgeted was $1,500.

THE COURT:

I see that.

MR. SMITH:

He paid $3,939, so he paid $2,439.23

too much, 2,439 too much.
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A

For counter tops?

Q

Yes.

A

I have no idea.

Matt cut his own deal on that as

well as the cabinets and I don't know what he paid.
Q

Matt cut his own deal on the counter tops?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Okay, but you would agree that there was $3800 more

paid than the zero or the dash that was on Exhibit 9?
A

If it's through the construction loan, if it was

disbursed through the construction loan under Matt's
direction.
Q

Okay.

All right.

I'm working off your numbers

here.
A

But I have no idea what Matt did.

Q

Didn't you tell Matt that he was supposed to

receive the plumbing fixtures in the master bedroom free?
A

I told Matt and we did, I believe, get some dis-

counts on plumbing.
Q

Was it supposed to be completely free?

A

The plumbing in the master bedroom?

Q

The fixtures, plumbing fixtures.

A

We can look at the plumber's bill and see if they

were.

I don't believe I told Matt that they were for free.

Q

Well, he got them free.

A

Good.

125

THE COURT:

Should we amend the Complaint?

MR. SMITH:

No.

I'm simply making a point that

there were some things that Matt got free.
THE COURT:

There is a risk, you know, of estab-

lishing that your client got something that he should have
paid for that he didn't.
MR. SMITH:

Sure, but it was —

THE COURT:

I understand.

I'm just making an

observation, Mr. Smith.
MR. SMITH:
Q

Thank you, Judge.

(By Mr. Smith) And wasn't he supposed to receive

half of the rest of the fixtures throughout the house —
well, the rest of the fixtures throughout the house, wasn't
he to get those from a supplier for half price?
A
items.

He did get substantial discounts through several
We have the plumber's invoice and many of them do

show discounts.

Matt was involved in that decision as well

He even picked them out.
Q

Okay, so it would not be your estimation that he

paid $2,000 more than he should have?
A

Should have —

he should have from what?

I mean,

from this line item cost right here?
Q

Right.

A

If he paid $2,000 more, it's noted through the

construction breakdown, yes.
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Q

On soffit and fascia, on number two, Exhibit 9, you

have written down $2,500 —

excuse me.

I believe you have

$2500 was to be paid for soffit and fascia, correct?
A

That's what the line item shows, yes.

Q

Okay, and Matt paid 5,000, correct?

A

If that's what it shows, correct.

That was —

in

the soffit and fascia, we got another substantial discount.
We got a crown type material and keyed out for a recessed
cans that Matt added in and Matt was involved in that, too,
yes.
Q

Did you have a change order for that?

A

Again there's —

there was nothing to change order

from.
Q

Okay.

In fact —

but in fact, you have no change

orders, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

All right, and —

but when the dust settled, Matt

paid $2,227 too much off the budgeted price in Exhibit 9 for
his soffits and fascia, correct?
A

If that's how you look at it.

Q

Okay.

A

I don't.

Q

Did you not tell Matt he would be getting his

carpet for half price?
A

Matt cut his own deal on his carpet.

I had no
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1

input.

2

Q

Well, didn't Matt cut his own deal on his carpet

3

because when he asked you about the half price deal, you said

4

it never existed?

5

A

Not true.

6

Q

Okay.

7

excuse me.

8

A

Flooring, $6,000 on this list.

9

Q

Sure, but that wasn't all carpet, was it?

10

A

Anything that goes —

11

Q

Okay.

12

half price?

13

A

14

brick.

15

only wanted to pay for every exact brick that he had on his

16

house and I did give him a credit on some brick.

17
18

Q

Well, wasn't there $6,000 budgeted —

or

There was $4500 budgeted for carpet, correct?

any floor coverings.

Was Matt supposed to receive his brick for

I'm not sure but Matt did get discounts from the
I believe Matt counted every individual brick and

Okay.

Heating and air-conditioning you have budg-

eted for $5,200, correct?

19

A

Correct.

That's what we have in there.

20

Q

And Matt ended up paying $7,660, or $2,460 beyond

21 I that, correct?
22

THE COURT

What did he pay?

Seven what?

23

MR. SMITH

$7,760.

24

THE COURT

All right.

25

MR. SMITH

Which is 2460 above that.
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1

Q

2

there.

3
4
5

Okay.

Excuse me.

I wasn't trying to be sarcastic

Why would you just put in an amount if the home was
worth $560,000?
A

What if it burned down?

As we —

Promax insures the home, what's normally

6

standard is we just put in the amount of the construction

7

loan or in progress as we do progress, we step up the insured

8

amount until we're complete and then it closes, so the amount

9

of the insurance related to the construction loan is stepped

10
11
12

up in stages.
Q

The home was completed what, August 15th

approximately?

13

A

I believe it was about that time, yes.

14

Q

And at that time you were declaring the value of

15

the home at $165,000. The loan was $190,200.

16

of that was for the lot and lots don't burn down.

17

the 165 figure instead of 190?

18

A

I guess part
Is that

I think if we look at the construction cost break-

19

down, their disbursements, that reflects to about the amount

20

of the disbursements of the loan at that time.

21
22

Q

Okay, and the amount of money it took to insure a

$165,000 home was roughly 46 bucks, wasn't it?

23

A

We have statements to verify that amount.

24

Q

Okay, and to insure it for double that amount would

25

have been only an extra 50 bucks, correct?
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completed.

It was stepped up.

That's what I'm assuming

there.
Q

Well, when the home was finished, wasn't the market

value of the home $450,000?
A
show —

We, I believe, had an offer for five —

what do you

565?

Q

Five sixty-five.

A

What somebody's willing to pay us, that would be

what it's worth.

That 330,000 is probably a number that Matt

and I decided to insure the property for and you're right,
that excludes the lot and maybe whatever else, landscaping,
I'm not sure, but the home was insured while it was under
construction loan.
Q

But do you have any other document that shows any-

thing before this August 20th — well, never mind.
One other question for you.

On the insurance

things that you were submitting, when you were submitting the
$165,000 value, isn't that in an column that says total estimated completed value?
A

The column of —

Q

Well, when you insured it in June and July, July

27th, when you insured it for $165,000, the column says total
estimated completed value.
A

Okay.

Q

Why didn't you give the total estimated completed
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A

Business management, human behavior, child

development.
Q

Have you previous to the experience you had with

Mr. Bates, had you ever been involved in the bidding or
pricing or building of a home?
A

Never.

Q

How did you come into contact with Mr. Bates?

A

I think in probably '88 or '89 he and his two

brothers built a furniture store for us so —
Q

Okay, and how did you come in contact with him

about building your home?
A

We had —

there was actually a lawsuit that his

brothers were trying to evict us out of our building.

R. C,

Willey's had come in and offered double what we paid on a
lease to try to get us out.
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

They upped the lease —
Your Honor, I don't know how

that's relevant.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
Q

Well, give me —

I don't either, Counsel.

(By Mr. Smith) All right.

Just really quickly,

that was the lawsuit that you won, correct?
A

Correct, yes.

Q

In fact, that was the lawsuit in which Pat Brian

censured the other side pretty heavily.
A

That's right.
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you can get great discounts off of it."

He had told me about

his partner, Coley Davis, how they had built this home.

They

had showed me an article, actually posted this home at 1.1
million dollars.

I was told that the home was built around

six hundred and fifty, $600,000, and that I could get these
same types of savings off of it.
I met with his partner Coley, actually gone through
this home during the Parade of Homes, and they just showed me
all these wonderful things, got me excited about it.

"You

can buy this home for, you know, virtually almost half
price."
Q

So you agreed to go with Phil as the builder?

A

Yeah, he showed us the area and we actually weren't

too excited about the area to build a home, but we were
looking

—
THE COURT:

Just a minute.

need to volunteer information.

We're getting into this

I want you to listen to the

question and answer the question only.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT:
Q

Okay.

(By Mr. Smith)

Go ahead, Mr. Smith.

Okay.

Did you apply for a

construction loan with Far West Bank?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

For $190,200.

How much of a loan did you apply for?
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1

Q

Why that amount?

2

A

Because that's what Phil told me the home would

3
4
5

cost.
Okay.

Q

Now, was there anything that you and Phil

did to arrive at that cost?

6

A

I don't want to —

7

Q

Well, just briefly.

8

homes?

9

A

Yes, we did.

Did you look at any other

We looked at actually this home right

10

here that he submitted as being my plans.

11

these plans, but I've been to those peoples' homes.

I never have seen

12

Q

Did you go to those homes with Phil?

13

A

Yes, we did, and he had a model home that was also

14

similar to this.

15

six homes.

16

Q

Did you tell Phil what you wanted from your home?

17

A

I did, yes.

18

Q

Okay.

19

We went through, I think probably five or

Now, you've looked at Exhibit 12, the second

set of plans.

20

A

Correct.

21

Q

Do those plans comply with the home that was built

22

for you?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

How much, if any, did Phil Bates tell you that that

25

home, that home, Exhibit 12, would cost completed?
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questions and pay close attention to what I'm asking.
A

This was the conversation.

what happened.

The conversation was

"Did I get cut out of the deal?"

And I said, "Phil, you were not in the deal.
brokers came to me and had said —
tion, not the observation.

Your

" This was the conversa-

The conversation was that they

came to me and said that they had —

that there was a poten-

tial that they would be used because you represented to them
that you had the listing on my home when in fact you did not
and they said please sign this deal and obviously, I wanted
to sell the home.
Q

How did he respond?

A

He said, "That's it.

I'm killing your deal.

You're dead."
And I said, "Well, you know, you do what you have
to do," and at this point I had no idea what he had meant by
that.
Q

You did not know how or if he would kill it?

A

No, I didn't.

Q

Okay.

Then what happened during the next couple of

days that you observed?
A

The very next day I received phone calls from a

Mr. Layton, from Randy Bathemess, from Farrell Workman, and
from Frank —

I think his last name is Richards from Marble

Glass, all of who told me —

this was right off the bat, that
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1

Phil had contacted them and said —

2

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

3

THE COURT:

4

Q

5

observed.

6

liened?

Was it brought to your attention that you had been

A

Yes.

8

Q

Okay.

10

Sustained.

(By Mr. Smith) Remember, I'm asking you what you

7

9

Object, that's hearsay.

Was it brought to your attention how many

people liened you?
A

Yes, I had six people lien me, four that day and

11

two the very next day, four on the first and two on the

12

second.

13
14

Q

Okay.

Did Phil Bates ever admit to you that he was

the one who —

15

A

Yes, he did.

16

Q

—

17
18
19

put this all together?

Will you please tell Judge Frederick what he said
to you concerning this?
A

I talked with Phil and, of course, I was furious at

20

this and Phil, and I said, "I c&n't believe you did that, you

21

know, that was completely low budget."

22

were owed no money at this time."

23

Q

I said, "These people

Let me interject one thing here.

Had any invoices

24

for this work of any of these people who liened you, had any

25

invoices by them been submitted to you?
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1
2
3
4
5

A

I had not received one invoice from one of these

people at that time.
Q

As far as you know, had any demand upon you been

made?
A

No, not to me.

6

aware of it.

7

Q

8

Okay.

If they had from Phil, I was not

Have you received any documentation from

Phil of any invoice or anything showing a demand?

9

A

At this point, no, I had not.

10

Q

Please tell Judge Frederick then after you had said

11
12
13

this to Phil, what he said to you.
A

"I told you if you don't pay me the commission, I'd

kill your deal."

14

I said, "Well, looks like you did it."

15

That same day —

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS: Sure.

You've answered the question.

18

Q

(By Mr. Smith)

19

A

He did.

20

Q

And I didn't get the exact verbiage of how he

21
22
23

Did he admit he killed the deal?

He told me he killed the deal.

admitted he killed it.
A

He said, "I told you I would kill the deal."
And I said, "You had those people lien me," and I

24

said, "Phil, I don't even know these people.

25

haven't completed their work.

These people

They haven't even billed me."
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And he said, "Well, I told you to pay me the
commission."
Q

Now, had Phil Bates made a demand upon you or did

Phil Bates lien you for $10,000 owed to him?
A

Phil Bates was not owed and he did not lien me, no.

Q

When was it that —

this December 2nd letter that

has this penciled amount of 10,000 that you saw, did you see
anything before then of a demand for $10,000 by Phil Bates?
A

No, no, he never asked me for any money.

Q

Okay, and in fact, didn't he indicate to you that

he had made a substantial amount of money off of Scott
Stowers who was doing plumbing work?
A

Absolutely, yes.

Q

And that much of the monies owed to him had come

out of that?
A

Yes.

Q

And did you not also make a payment to him of

$2,000 on top of that?
A

Correct.

Q

And did you not give him a lien waiver for payment

in full for all his fees?
A

Yes, we did.

Q

I'll show the Court that in a moment.

We'll come

back to that.
Will you please turn to Exhibit 9?

This is the one
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happen to you if you did not go through the Parade of Homes?
A

In fact, he did because at the time when we had the

problem with the paint, I had said, "Look, this is it.
pulling out.

I'm

We're not going to do this because I can't

afford this."
Q

How much was budgeted for the paint?

A

$4,000.

Q

And when the painting job came around, how much did

Phil tell you it was going to be?
A

$14,000. He said he made a mistake of $10,000. I

said, "You know, you're paying for this."
And he says, "I can't afford to eat it."
I said, "I can't afford to eat it.

This is what

the agreement was."
Q

Did he acknowledge that he made a mistake?

A

He did, yes.

Q

Okay, and if you had pulled out of the Parade of

Homes, what, if anything, would have happened to you?
A

According to Phil, what he had told me is that the

contractors that had given us these discounts would then sue
me for the full amount because they would not have exposure
that they had contracted with him for.
Q

And your understanding would be that would add how

much cost to your home?
A

Forty percent more.
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1
2

these items?
A

3
4

I believe the items —
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

Object, it's opinion.

foundation.

5

MR. SMITH:

6

ordinary knowledge of a person.

7

time here.

8
9
10

No

Your Honor, I believe this is in the

THE COURT:

I'm trying to save a lot of

The witness is the owner and I'm of the

view that he can testify as to what his anticipated loss of
costs of repairs would be.

11

Q

(By Mr. Smith)

12

A

Yes, I have.

Have you talked to any contractors?

In fact, a number of them.

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS: We have bids for $23,000, I believe,

15

What is your estimated cost of repair?

and change.

16

MR. SMITH:

17

could submit those bids to you.

18

testimony, I will move on.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

Judge, if you would like, I
If you just want to take his

Well, as I've indicated, as a legal

20

matter, he's entitled as the owner of the property to testify

21

as to what his loss is or his cost of repair is.

22
23

Q

(By Mr. Smith)

Did you notify Mr. Bates about

these defects?

24

A

Yes, I did.

25

Q

Did you send him a fax?

220

A A o f* r* rj

1

testify to that.

2

THE COURT:

3

Well, I think he's now indicated that

that's what he was told, so the objection is sustained.

4

MR. SMITH:

5

Q

6

Thank you, Judge.

(By Mr. Smith)

Have you done any research on your

own to determine what the value of your home is today?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

And what is that determination?

9

A

I believe it's about 420.

10

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

11

Object if he's testifying as to

what somebody told him.

12

THE COURT:

Well, that's correct.

The man can

13

testify as to the value of his own property.

14

however, to emphasize that by showing that it's based upon

15

hearsay.

He has an opinion.

16

factors.

As the owner, he can tell us what his opinion as to

17

the value is.

18

MR. SMITH:

19

research.

20

Q

21

We don't need,

It can be based on a variety of

Thank you, Judge, and I asked him for

I was not asking for comments by realtors.
(By Mr. Smith) And what is your estimation of the

value of the home?

22

A

Four hundred to four hundred and twenty.

23

Q

Okay, and at the time the sale did not go through?

24

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

25

Q

When you received the $565,000 offer, what was your
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1

home worth then?

2

A

Probably 390, 395.

3

Q

Do you think there's any way you could get !565 for

4

your home today?

5

A

No.

6

Q

I'm just going to show you a couple of things

7

quickly,

8

if any, value a lien waiver had?

9
10

A

did Mr. Bates ever tell you what,

It makes it so that people supposedly can't lien

you anymore is what he told me,

11
12

The first is —

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

That's nonresponsive to the

question.

13

THE WITNESS:

He told me that people can't lien you

14

after they send a lien waiver.

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18
19
20

Q

I'll allow that to stand.

(By Mr. Smith)

Okay.

Will you please tell the

Judge who those lien waivers are from?
A

They are from Dillman Electric, Phil Bates and

General Plumbing Contractors and Phil Bates.
Q

Okay.

Now, was any work done on your —

now, these

21

are dated the 25th of October of '93. This is after your

22

home was built, correct?

23

A

Yes, it was.

24

THE COURT:

Is this an exhibit?

25

MR. SMITH:

Yes, Judge.
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A

Probably, yeah.

Q

That home doesn't have an indoor pool, does it?

A

It does not as far as I know.

Q

The basement in that home was not finished, was it?

A

I actually didn't go in the basement, so I don't

I didn't see one.

know.
Q

Your home has a completely finished basement,

doesn't it?
A

Sixty percent finished.

Q

Did you consider the basement as including the pool

area?
A

Yeah, uh-huh.

Well, actually, there's other areas

in the basement that are not finished, as well.
Q

Now, I guess the question goes to there's a pool

area, then there's another area that's part of the basement
that's not part of the pool area, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

Is it 60 percent of the pool area plus that other

area that's unfinished?
A

Probably —

I don't know even the square feet.

Probably I'd say it's probably within that realm, yeah.
Q

Isn't it true that you negotiated the contract with

Mermaid Pools directly?
A

Both Phil and I actually —

I'm sorry.

Q

And that you signed the contract with Mermaid
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1
2 I
3

Pools?
A

Both Phil and I talked with them, but I signed it

because he didn't have the credit.

They wouldn't accept him.

4

Q

And you worked directly with Mermaid Pools?

5

A

We both did.

He actually worked with plumbing and

6

the excavation and laying all the plumbing work but, yeah,

7

talking with him about having that —

8
9

THE COURT:

No.

Just a minute.

again.

10

THE WITNESS: Okay.

11

THE COURT:

12
13
14

You're rambling

The question was fairly specific.

State it again.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

You worked directly with

Mermaid Pools?

15

A

On some things, yes.

16

Q

On the pool itself?

17

A

In addition to others, yes, I did work with them.

18

Q

Let me show you what's been marked as Plaintiff's

19

Exhibit No. 63.

Is that your signature that appears in the

20

lower right-hand corner?

21

A

It is, yes.

22

Q

And that's the contract between you and Mermaid

23

Pools for the pool, isn't it?

24

A

Correct, yes.

25

Q

And you asked that —

you had a discussion with
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Q

Did you ever seek any written documentation?

A

This was good enough.
THE COURT:

No.

THE WITNESS:

I thought this was.

The question is, did you seek any?

Oh, I'm sorry.

No, I did not, other

than this, no.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Did Jim Beech ever advise you

to get it in writing?
A

No, he just said, "Watch your costs."

Q

Isn't it true that that cost breakdown was provided

to the bank so you could obtain the construction loan?
THE COURT:
did.

I didn't hear you.

Maybe the witness

You've got to keep your voice up.
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

I'm sorry about it.

THE COURT: Okay.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Isn't it true that that cost

breakdown was provided to the bank only so you could obtain a
construction loan?
A

I have no idea why he submitted it to the bank, but

that could be for his reasons. As far as I know, this was
what the home was supposed to be.
THE COURT:

If you don't know the answer, say you

don't know the answer.
THE WITNESS:

I don't know why he submitted it,

yeah.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Do you have anything in
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that right?
A

Yes.

Q

Isn't it true that during the course

Of ithis,

you

had $127, 000 in your bank account?
A

1 approximately, yes •
I did, yes, clLose bo,

Q

Isn't it true that you dealt directly on audio

visual center?
A

I did for the most part.

Q

On the paint?

A

Yes and no.

Q

Okay.

A

I didn't deal with his painter, no.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes and no.

Q

You negotiated the cabinets?

A

Yes and no.

Q

And you dealt with the framers?

A

No, I mean, other than, "How you doing?"

You negotiated the counter tops?

THE COURT: Oh.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I mean ^-

You know, all of us here recognize,

sir, that the examination is not relating to daily greetings.
Did you deal with them in terms of negotiating what they were
to do and what they were to be paid for?
THE WITNESS:

No, no, I did not.
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a little more specific.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Isn't it true that you speci-

fied the location for tile work?
A

In certain areas, yes.

Q

You chose the type of quality of the tile?
THE COURT:

Of course.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Certainly.

That's just what we dis-

cussed, wasn't it, Counsel, a minute ago?
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

Your Honor, what we're showing

here is that he was intimately involved
THE COURT:

—

I'm sure he is around a lot of the

time, but the distinction here that needs to be made to
assist me , at least, if that's what you're seeking to do, is
what he was actually doing in the way of functioning as a de
facto contractor as opposed to simply maybe an overly interested homeowner.
Q

That's the distinction.

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Okay.

You contracted

directly with Marble Glass, correct?
A

We both talked with him, but yeah, I did.

Q

And what did they provide?

A

They provided the cabinets for the house.

Q

Relating to the sale to Curtis Johnson, did you

ever sign the Earnest Money Agreement?
A

Yes •
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1

at that time.

2
3

THE COURT: Well, now we're examining him about it,
so I presume you agree it ought to be received.

4

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

5

THE COURT:

Yeah.

So 54 is now received, so having

6

received it, I'd like to see it when you're through with it,

7

Mr. Braunberger.

8

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

9
10

Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Do you have any addendums to

that Earnest Money Agreement or counter offers?

11
12

Sure.

A

I don't know if there are any there —

or you mean

in addition to that?

13

Q

Yes.

14

A

I think that there were because he'd offered origi-

15

nally 565.

I'm sorry.

16

THE COURT:

17

beyond what is here?

18
19

THE WITNESS:

22

I don't think so, no, I don't believe

so.

20
21

The question is, do you have anything

THE COURT: All right.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Was there a signed addendum

where you agreed to things?

23

A

There may have been so —

24

Q

What was the final agreement?

25

You'd sell for a

hundred and fifty thousand?
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1

A

Five hundred and fifty,

2

Q

Five hundred and fifty thousand without furniture?

3

A

Correct, yeah, that was the difference.

4

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

5

Your Honor, may I see that

exhibit?

6

THE COURT:

7

Q

8

Yes, you may.

(By Mr. Braunberger)

I show you paragraph no. 1

where it lists Matt Mattson and Promax as sellers.

9

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

10

Q

Can you explain that?

11

A

Yeah.

Actually Phil Bates tried to sell my home to

12

this Mr. Johnson, somehow claiming it was his home.

13

actually stipulated on page 3 that he was the —

14

that he had a written agreement to sell the home, so I did

15

not fill any of this in at all.

16

Q

17

He'd

representing

Is that cleared up in subsequent documents you

don't have with you today?

18

A

19

It may have been.

It probably was.

In fact, in

fact, I thought they had scratched it out so —

20

Q

21

Isn't it true that after that sale didn't go

through, you made no effort to list your home?

22

A

Well, yes.

23

Q

Since that sale went through, you've made no effort

24

to sell your home?

25

A

Actually, we have attempted to, yeah.

254
I

A J.. M <* n /*

your line of questioning here is an attempt to establish that
Horsley may not have been credible because of some relationship he has with this witness, then, you see, that puts me at
a difficult posture.

I have accepted the proffer on the

basis of when it was given me without regard to issues of
credibility and bias, so further examination about any business connection, et cetera, that this witness may have with
Horsley is not helpful to me.
All right.
MR. SMITH:
Q

Thank you, Judge.

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Would you agree with me that

your home has approximately 7,113 square feet?
A

I really don't know, to be quite honest with you.

Q

So you have nothing that would dispute Mr. Bates's

testimony on that matter?
A

No.

I believe it's less, but I don't have

anything.
Q

Isn't it true that Phil was not involved on —

in

the lawsuit that you had with his brothers except as a
witness?
MR. SMITH:

Objection, Judge.

THE COURT:

I'm not sure that that's going to help

me, Mr. Braunberger.

Quite frankly, what has gone on before

in the lives of these folks I consider to be essentially
irrelevant anyway.

I'm concerned about the dispute they have
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1

MR. BRAUNBERGER:

2

Q

It goes to credibility.

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Let's look at page 93 of the

3

deposition, beginning on line 6.

That says, "You had to

4

borrow 75, 70,000 on your credit cards to pay sub-

5

contractors?"

6

A

"Yes."

7

Q

"And you're saying that you had to pay $150,000

8

more than what you allege the contract amount to be?"

9

A

"About 140 I think."

10 I

Q

"Where did the other 60, 70,000 come from?"

11

A

"I had a hundred and twenty-seven thousand in my

12

bank account.

13

money.

14

that money out and dumped it into the loan."

15
16

I kept —

I keep a lot of cash or a lot of

I try to have all my debts paid off and I sucked all

Q

Why didn't use the whole 127,000 cash that you had

instead of running up credit cards?"

17

A

Because I have actually a couple of funds which are

18

—

I have —

19

have a missionary fund as well as I have a college fund for

20 I our children

I did not really want to bring this up, but I

and I have a bank account,

so we depleted

—

and

21

all this is in the bank and we depleted the money out of my

22

bank account and out of the college fund.

23

mission fund."

24
25

Q

We kept intact our

Earlier you testified that Promax made money off of

Scott Stowers.
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1

talked in their master bedroom.

2

Q

Tell me what was said during that conversation.

3

A

While we were talking about that, Matt was building

4

a TV system installed in the ceiling over his bedroom, as I

5

recall.

6

7
8

9

THE COURT:

I think the question, sir, was, what

was said and by whom.
THE WITNESS:

Oh.

We were just talking about the

various things that he was doing for upgrades and Matt

10

mentioned to me, he said, you know, talking about all the

11

deals that come along and I says, "Oh, yeah," I says, "I went

12

over $200,000 over my project."

13

And he said —

he showed me a sauna system that was

14

going in that he got like at half price and was trying to

15

find somebody to put it together for him, just a number of

16

items that he was talking with me about, and he was, you

17

know, concerned, and I says —

18

in I was noticing and I says, "How are you planning on paying

19

for, you know, these upgrades, indoor pool, all this stuff?"

20

he was putting a lot of things

And he says, "Well," he says, "you know, I've got

21

$150,000 on my credit cards. That's how I started my furni-

22

ture business," and he says, "And my business is real

23

successful so I'll be able to pay for the rest of this, you

24

know, through that."

25

And I says, "Oh, well," i says, "be careful because
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you can really go over on these."
And he says, "Yeah, I'm thinking about putting
together the shower system myself and maybe I'll get somebody," and his wife was really concerned and had chatted with
me before he came about all this activity that was going on
and with all these offers.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Was there any discussion with

him about the fact that Promax was going to build the house
for him at some fixed fee?
A

Typically Promax makes 10 to 12 percent on a home.
THE COURT: No.

Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Was there any discussion with

him that Promax was going to build that house for a fixed
fee?
A

We were going to do him a favor and build the home

plus $10,000.
THE COURT:

No.

The question is, was there a

discussion between you two or three at that time about —
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Okay.
Q

(By Mr. Braunberger)

Did he say anything like

that?
THE COURT:

That's starting out leading, Counsel,

(By Mr. Braunberger)

I'm sorry.

You said before that he was concerned about this
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extra money you'd have to come up with.

Did he say why he

was concerned?
A

Just that it was difficult for him to turn down all

of those upgrades you could get and you have a one-time shot
at doing it because it's in the Parade of Homes and I mean,
he was even doing some painting himself and I was talking to
Phil and going, "This is going to slow us down to make the
Parade deadline," you know, having him do this, and I told
Phil my concern, "You sure this guy's going to be able to
cover all this?"
Phil says, "Yeah, he says he's going to be able
to. "
And I says, "I hope so."

He mentioned he's got a

couple of other sources for doing this.
great deals at these parades.

Like I said, you get

I was concerned.

We felt,

because we built his partner's home, that that worked out
fine, that this would, too.
Q

Okay.

What was the basis that you built his

partner Jim Beech's home?
MR. SMITH:

I would object, your Honor, elements.

THE COURT:

I would think more than that, it's not

a matter that I can recall having been gone into on cross,
Counsel, so I think it's beyond the scope.
MR. BRAUNBERGER:

I don't have any other questions.

THE COURT: All right.

You may cross.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION

1
2
3
4

BY MR. SMITH;
Q

An obvious answer, I guess:

Promax is suing my

client, correct?

5

A

That's correct.

6

Q

You're being sued, Promax is being sued by my

7

client, correct?

8

A

That's what I've heard.

9

Q

Okay, and you do not want to lose a bunch of money,

10

you don 't not want your company to lose a bunch of money in

11

this lawsuit, do you?

12

A

Well, I don't plan on it.

I mean, yesterday I

13

heard that we were offered that if we dropped, everybody

14

would go their way.

15
16

Q

I want you to

answer my questions, please.
Now, you and Phil had a deal to build Matt

17
18

I want you to stop right there.

Mattson 's home for whatever it cost plus $10,000, correct?

19

A

That's correct.

20

Q

And so there was no basic price, correct?

21

A

That's correct.

22

Q

And you and Phil never talked about a basic price,

23

correct ?

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

So you never had any understanding about a basic
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1

price of something around 190, correct?
A

I was told two weeks before and I'd asked Matt that

he was getting a construction loan for 190.
Q

Right, but Phil never told you or Matt never told

you that you were going to try to have a basic price of 190,
correct?
A

Not that 1 recall.

I asked him what his construc-

tion loan was for.
Q

Okay.

Did you tell the truth when we took your

deposition?
A

Yep.

Q

Okay.

deposition?

Could you please turn to page 23 of this

I'm going to read what the attorney Allen

Bouvedas asked you and then if you could please read your
answer.
A

On which one?

Q

Line no. 2.

A

Okay.

Q

Line 6.

"There wasn't a situation where you guy

promised one price and all of a sudden he's paying out more
money because of mistakes on your part?"
Answer, please, line 9.
A

"No. As a matter of fact, when I talked with him

about going over there were choices and decisions that he
made for various upgrades and stuff, but that specific
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1

question, I never heard anything like that if it happened, if

2

it did happen."

3
4

Q

"Now, in Matt's house did they have a specific

price in mind when they built his house?"

5

A

I don't know.

6

Q

Will you please read the answer?

7

A

"No, in Matt's house did they have a specific — "

8

Okay.

9

"Phil told me that there was a basic price that

10

they were going to try to do this that they wanted to do it

11

at."

12

Q

"What was that?"

13

A

"I don't know.

14
15
16

mind, or 195."
Q

19
20

Now, I thought you told me —

well, let me ask the

question.

17
18

The figure of 165 sticks in my

Now, 190,200, that was the price they were going to
do it at then; is that what Phil told you?
A

Yeah, that Matt wanted to do, that's what seems to

stick in my mind or something like that.

21

Q

Did you forget that?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Why didn't you?

24

A

It was something like that.

25

Q

Well --
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A

Okay.

I was told what the construction loan —

what he was shooting for, that that's what he was going to go
to the bank and get the rest of it which you're —
ney didn't allow us.

the attor-

I don't know, for the record here —

THE COURT: Wasn't the question, did he forget
that, and he said no?
MR. SMITH: Yeah.
THE COURT:
answer here.

Okay.

Let's proceed question and

That's the only way we can really do it.

Do you have a question?
Q

(By Mr. Smith)

Ask him.

I asked you if there was a basic

price going in and you told me there was not just a minute
ago, correct?
A

The basic price for everything, I don't know what

that question means.
for upgrades —

For everything, for construction loan,

a lot of people get a construction loan, sir,

and then they put cash for whatever else they're doing.

The

only thing I know between 160 and 190 was a construction
loan.

I do not know if that was or was not the total price

of everything that was going to be done.
Q

Why didn't you say that?

Why did you say, quote,

Phil told me there was a basic price that they were going to
try to do this at and they wanted to do it at?
A

Sir, when they did my deposition, the lady —

I

don't know who you call it that takes notations there —
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1

Q

Court reporter.

2

A

Court reporter.

When we were finished, my attorney

3

wanted to clarify some points.

4

16 years that she's ever seen it done.

5

cation on some of these points.

6

done.

Matt refused clarifi-

He got up and says, "We're

We're leaving."

7
8

It was the first time in her

And when they left she says, "In all my experience
in 16 years of doing this — "

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

I'm just telling you, we've got to clarify

11
12

MR. SMITH:

—

I object to the hearsay by this

gentleman.

13

THE WITNESS:

14

THE COURT:

It's not hearsay.

What is happening here is we're not

15

proceeding in question and answer form.

First of all, let me

16

inquire, have you got any further examination of this

17

witness?

18

MR. SMITH:

Yeah, a couple of questions.

19

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, what I want you to do,

20

sir, Mr. Davis, is listen to the question and answer the

21

question only.

22

about it, that's where your lawyer comes in.

If more information needs to be brought out

23

THE WITNESS: Okay.

24

THE COURT:

25

Q

All right.

(By Mr. Smith)

Okay.

Did your attorney tell you
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1
2

Good afternoon, counsel.

This is the

time set for ruling in the matter of Promax Development

4

Company versus Matt Mattson, et cetera, case number C-95-3616

6
7

In this matter both counsel are present, as is M r .
Bates, representative of the plaintiff corporation.
The trial in this matter was conducted on the 15th

8

and 16th of March of 1996.

9

the matter was taken under advisement by this Court to

10

further consider the testimony elicited, as well as the

11

numerous exhibits received.

12

prepared to rule.

13

At the conclusion of the trial

I have now done so and am

The plaintiff corporation seeks a determination

14

that the defendants breached an oral contract to the olaintif

15

in that they failed to pay various suppliers and material

16

men and failed to pay plaintiff's contracting fee.

17

o

THE COURT:

3

5

2
Q

P R O C E E D I N G S

Alternatively, plaintiff seeks a judgment for

18

quantum meruit or unjust enrichment in that the defendants

19

received the benefit, it is alleged, of much more than they

20

bargained for.

<

O
2

2

21

Defendants deny there are any sums owing pursuant

22

to the contract or that they received more than they

23

bargained for.

24

plaintiff, alleging that the plaintiff breached the

25

construction contract itself by exceeding the agreed-to

o

Indeed, they counter-claimed against the

1

cost, that the plaintiff did not fulfill

the warranty of

2

workmanlike services and that the defendants' prospective

3

economic advantage was interfered with by the plaintiff or

4

its agents.
In addition, it is alleged by the defendants that

5
6

they were slandered by the plaintiffs and that they are

7

seeking herein punitive damages.

8

Essentially every material point in this case is

9

disputed by the parties.

10

therefore, assess

11

witnesses and examine the corroborating physical evidence.

12

Having now done so,

13

ruling that the credible evidence establishes the facts as

Consequently, this Court must,

the credibility of the respective

I am prepared to rule, and it is my

14 follows.
15

The defendants were approached by the plaintiff's

16 agent Bates with a proposal to purchase a home to be con17 structed at 6642 South Stone Mill Drive in Salt Lake County
18 for the 1993 Parade of Homes.

Pursuant to negotiations,

19 the defendants applied for and received construction
o
z

20 financing from Farr West Bank for the sum of $190,200, plus
21 the one-half purchase price of the lot in question, an

5
tt
O

22 additional $29,000.

Compare Exhibits 7, the appraisal by

23 the bank, Exhibit 2, the construction loan approval, and
24 Exhibit 9, the construction cost breakdown.
25

After the approval of the loan, the defendants

1

closed the transaction on April 15th, 1993, for the sura of

2

$190,200, Exhibit 10, the trust deed note, and Exhibit 11,

3

the trust deed itself.

4
5

defendant would pay $10,000 as the builder's fee, plus pay

6

for all supplies and labor supplied to the job pursuant to

7

a so-called cost-plus contract, notwithstanding the financing

8

documents with the bank specifying the price of $190,200

9

for the construction itself.

10

a

<
o
z

2
o

Plaintiff claims the agreement was that the

While the defendants during construction were

11

intimately involved in the selection of materials and, to

12

some extent, dealing with suppliers and material men, their

13

involvement was no more than one might reasonably expect

14

from buyers of a home under construction.

15

were advised by Bates even up through the completion of the

16

home that they were within their budget.

17

aware of the massive overruns of some $170,000 until August

18

the 15th of 1993, Exhibit 55, the final cost breakdown, which

19

occurred at the completion of the construction.

20

The defendants

They were not made

Essentially all of the contractors 1 payment

21

authorizations executed by the defendant Matt Mattson

22

reflected the current loan balance was within the budget,

23

Exhibits 16 through 20, and the updated construction cost

24

breakdown, Exhibit 21.

25

At all times defendants sought but were refused by

Bates a written contract specifying the terms of the
agreement, namely, whether it was a cost-plus or specified
fixt cost contract•
Mark Barraclough, the former loan officer of Parr
West Bank who handled the construction loan, stated in his
deposition that "we went in for a certain dollar figure to
accommodate the builder and the borrower-"

He further

testified that in his 18 years as a construction loan
officer, cost-plus contracts were extremely rare and he had
only seen approximately six of them, and moreover, that he
would not have authorized an arbitrary price for construction.
Plaintiff asserts that the price of $190,200 was
merely arbitrary to get things going, given the press of time
to meet the Parade time table.
When confronted with the overruns, defendants were
forced to charge some $75,000 on their credit cars and
exhaust their savings to pay the overage-

At the completion,

the home had a value of $390,000. At no time was there a
writing that the loan amount was either estimated or
arbitrary or indeed, that the agreement was cost-plus.
Though plaintiff claims that the overage was due
to the defendants' making changes in the original plans,
Exhibit 12, not one written change order was obtained or
produced at the trial. At no time until completion of the

project did Bates advise the defendants of any specific
overages.

While plaintiffs claim the appraisal was based

upon a smaller, less expensive home, plaintiff acknowledges
the appraiser was never advised of this view.

After the

completion, defendants were able to obtain an offer from a
ready, willing and able buyer to purchase the home for
$560,000, Mr. Curtis Johnson, Exhibit 54 is the earnest
money receipt and offer to purchase.
On August 28th, 1993, realizing this would relieve
their tremendous financial burden, defendants accepted the
offer.

However, when Bates was advised of this fact, he

insisted, as a licensed realtor, that he be used as the
agent to sell the home so he could acquire the commission.
When told by the defendants that he would not be used,
Bates told Matt Mattson he would "kill your deal."
The next day defendants received calls from some
six lienors that they were going to lien the home, even
though no prior demands were made and defendants thought
they were current on their obligations.
Bates advised the defendants he had suppliers
and/or material men file liens even though he knew no
demands for payment had been made on the defendants.
Exhibits 44 through 48 and 52 and 53, notices of lien.
The potential buyer, when apprised of the liens,
backed out of the transaction.

On two other occasions Bates engaged in the so-callep.
cost-plus versus fixed price

bait and switch action.

Rick

and Martha Riley testified that after Bates's involvement
with the defendants, they had Bates in 1993 build their
home with the understanding that they had a fixed price
agreement of $300,000.

There was no written agreement.

After the Rileys paid their $300,000, Bates demanded an
additional $160,000 for extras.

The Rileys finally paid

Bates an additional $30,000 just to be rid of the problem.
Bates had threatened the Rileys that if they did to him
what the Ilattsons did, he would "burn them" as he had the
Mattsons.
^.va Kumaraa testified that Bates built his home
before March of 1994.

After closing, when everything was

paid, Bates demanded more money.

He harassed Kumaraa to

the point where Kumaraa paid him an additional $600 again to
get rid of the problem.

Exhibit 57 is the cancelled check

endorsed by Phil Eates dated August 12th, 1994.

The Kumaraa

budget was for $100,000 and the overage was an additional
$13,000.

There was again no written contract.
After plaintiff completed defendants1 home, numerous

deficiencies appeared which were brought to Bates's
attention, Exhibit 67, within the one-year warranty period.
With the exception of the faulty rain gutters, nothing was
corrected.

The cost of repairs is $23,000.

Defendants have

paid the various overages and the lineholders, Exhibits
58 and 62, which are the lien waivers.
The owner of the plaintiff corporation acknowledged
in his deposition that he was aware that the "basic price was
about $195,000f" while at trial he insisted that the contract
was cost-plus.
The testimony presented on behalf of the plaintiff
is too inconsistent and contradictory to be persuasive.
Based upon the foregoing, as well as the other evidence
produced at trial, this Court finds that the parties had a
fixed price contract for $190,200, plus $29,000 for onehalf of the lot price, for a total of $219,200.
The defendants paid approximately $170,000 more
than called for due to plaintiff's failure to keep them
apprised of the overage, thus breaching the contract.
Plaintiff has therefore failed in its burden to
establish breach by the defendants.

Moreover, the

defendants have not received any uncompensated benefit.
The theory of quantum meruit under either branch
fails.

This Court finds no cause of action on the

plaintiff's Complaint.
On the contrary, the defendants have suffered
losses in the amount of $23,000 for breach of the plaintiff's
warranties of proper workmanship and failure to timely
repair the defects.
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1

This Court further finds that Bates maliciously

2

and with the intent to harm interfered with defendants'

3

prospective econimic advantage by directly thwarting

4

defendants' opportunity to sell their home for $560,000,

5

causing damage in the amount of $170,000.

6

by taking the market value of $390,000, deduct it from the

7

prospective sales price of 560,000, leaving the resulting

8

$170,000 loss.

9

That's calculated

Insufficient evidence has been presented to enable

10

this Court to award punitive damages or damages under the

11

slander theo]try.

12

judgment against the plaintiff for $193,000, plus costs of

Accordingly, defendants are awarded

13 ' this action.
14
15

3

§

Conclusions of Lav; and Judgment.

16

Are there any questions?

17

MR. BRAUNEERGER:

18

THE COURT:

19
Q
2

Mr. Smith, you prepare the Findings of Fact,

20

No, your Honor.

All right.

Thank you, counse 1.

We •11

be in recess
MR, SMITH:

Judge, there was one question .

The

S
2

21

ruling was that there was a malicious interference with

2
cc
p

22

contract responsible for $170,000.

23

account the cost overruns; is that correct?

24
25

THE COURT:

I assume that takes into

The $170,000 is the amount of the loss

for the sale , and as far as the cost overruns are concer ned,

_2

I conclude that the parties received what they paid for.
Therefore, in my estimation, there is no damage claim
back for that sum.

That's all the evidence has established,

plus they get $23,000 for the unworkmanlike work that was
accomplished, thereby resulting in the 193,000 total
judgment.
MR. SMITH:

Thanks, Judge.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
•

*
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